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ABSTRACTi
This thesis examines the record of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
Development (KFAED) in light of changing fashions regarding the proper
role and management of such funds in the development finance process. The
key questions addressed are whether its concessional aid is allocated
according to Donor Interest (DI) or Recipient Needs (RN), what precisely is
the grant element in KFAED loans, whether this grant allocation is consistent
with the fund's stated policy and if it is linked to one or more of the currently
held views regarding how aid should be allocated in order to be most effective
- to overcome the "two gaps," to strengthen institutions and governance or to
reward/incentivize effective macroeconomic management.
The KFAED is an interesting and important subject of study for many
reasons. After Saudi Arabia, Kuwait is the second largest Arab aid donor,
having contributed a total of more than $18.5 billion between 1960 and 2002.
It was the first to officially establish a bilateral aid institution: KFAED, which
purports to be free of mercantilist motives as its aid is not tied to procurement,
as is the case with most developed countries' aid institutions.
The thesis consists of three mutually dependent sections. The first surveys the
domain of theoretical and empirical development economics since World War
II. It reviews its evolution over time, linking successes and failures in
development aid to the refinement of macroeconomic points of view among
various schools of thought. Since the implementation of any economic policy
is highly sensitive to the political goals of the policy makers, we show that the
evolution of macroeconomic theory is not, in itself, able to account for
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changes in the pattern of development aid. "Fashions" in such aid reflect not
only the past history of aid itself, but also the histories of the donor nations or
their multi-lateral vehicles. Our specific interest in regional Arab geopolitical
development is contextualized in order to trace the effects of development
theory evolution on the Middle Eastern region.
The second section studies the aid allocation of the KFAED. It seeks to
determine, among other things, whether the allocation of aid reflects recipient
needs or donor interest. We modeled the allocation decision as a two-stage
process: selection and allocation. The empirical analysis demonstrates that
income, ethnicity, religion and politics are all factors in the selection stage.
Arab, Muslims countries and more populous countries receive a higher share
of the total aid allocated (allocation stage).
The third section extends the second by adding the third stage: grant element
determination. It addresses two questions: how grant element is calculated
and what factors influence its allocations. In addressing the first question, we
offer a rationale for an adjusted discount rate in calculating grant element--the
percentages of subsidy embedded in the loan. When this rate is applied, the
results point to consistent overestimation of the traditionally published grant
element statistics.
We then examine the grant element allocation. We find that the actual
allocation is quite different than that implied by the stated policy of the
KFAED. Chief among the sources of variation are political factors, income
and sectors.
Finally, we test to see if the current grant element allocation is in line with
any of the three views regarding how aid should be allocated: the two gap,
macroeconomic management, and governance and institutions building. We
find that it is weakly related to the two-gap view, but appears to bear no
relation to the other two.
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Addendum
The following pages list all current corrections to the submitted version of my PhD
thesis. The mistakes were discovered after the Final version was submitted, and were
noticed by the author during his attempt to apply the same study on other Arab
developmental institutions.
The mistakes mostly involve instances in which source material was mistakenly included
in the text when I ran a program on the text to check on the text's sources and formatting.
Two sources that were deleted I have restored, and the rest have been already cited in the
footnotes and end of chapter references. Due to formatting error, the tables numbering
got mixed.
All errata are explained under three headings. The first cites page and line number,
followed by the first and last words of the text to be replaced, followed by the corrected
passage.
For the sake of clarity, I replaced a few long passages in their entirety despite the fact
that they contain many lines that don't require correction.
Finally, these corrections do not affect any of the thesis results or conclusion. We
apologize for any inconvenience this may cause the reader.
Page 68 Line 2
Replace "This is ... observations." with:
There is a widespread perception, even in the aid community, that Kuwait's aid policy is driven
largely by its solidarity with the development needs of poor countries, since, outside of its PP
wealth, Kuwait could easily be in the same state. It is thus acting out of conscience rather than to
gain self- interested and political ends. An econometric model for the allocation of KFAED
concessional aid is proposed in this paper. We present the allocation decision as unfolding in two
stages, namely: first, the decision to grant aid, and then, how much. These two steps will be
explicitly modeled in order to capture and explain the relationship between them and KFAED
decision process. We will apply models derived from the literature of aid allocation to frame the
processes by which KFAED allocated and distributed aid during the 1974-2001 period, and see
whether the determinants of aid really match its officially stated justifications.
Following this introduction, Section II provides a descriptive analysis of Kuwait aid in a
historical perspective. In Section III, aid literature is reviewed, along with the hypotheses about
Kuwait bilateral aid selection and distribution among recipient countries. This framework is
tested in Section IV, and the empirical analyses and results are presented in Section V.
Concluding observations.
Page 71 Line 9 Replace "he" with the
Errata - P 2
Page 73 Line 13: Replace "the basic ... Rodrik (1996)" with:
The consensus point of view is that donor nations and entities allocate their foreign aid in order to
maximize their own objectives, rather than seeking to achieve exogenous goals, such as those that
emerge in the recipient states. The true motive set can only be logically inferred, outside of the
unlikely case that the researcher gets a chance to examine the pertinent documents involved in the
allocation process. The methodological assumption about aid allocation decisions is that the
aid makers, in the donor states, look for recipients who must be a., worth targeting (for
economic, strategic, or other reasons), and b., have mechanisms in place such that they can
organize and adjust structures so as to bring them in line with the donor country's policy
suggestions. The methodology thus involves establishing viable hypotheses relating aid flows to
the observed characteristics of recipient countries and donors' other motives, (see McGillivray
and White 1993a).
Earlier studies, (eg Wittkopf (1973), Mckinlay and Little (1977; 1978a, 1978b; 1979), McKinlay
(1978), Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and Tsoutsoplides (1991)), treated recipient needs (hereafter
RN) and donor interests (hereafter DI) separately, by modeling each as stand alone aspects of aid
allocation.. The RN model assumes that the optimum plea for aid must appeal to the donor's
sense of duty, as it were: thus, the appeal highlights and focuses on the recipient candidates
economic and social welfare. On the other hand, the DI model supposes that donors use the
allocation of aid to gain foreign policy and strategic objectives and/or to promote their own
economic self-interest. From the RN point of view, developmental aid is a form of international
justice. But the DI point of view seems to be the better approach to how the pattern of
development aid has really evolved in the three decades prior to the 1990s, at least for bilateral
donors. Not unexpectedly, however, the RN point of view does a better job of accounting for the
pattern of multilateral aid allocation, since the latter necessarily dilutes the individual donating
nation's self interest, according to Maizels and Nissanke (43 percent of the variation). The
dilution of interests may allow multilateral agencies more elbow room to engage in enterprises
that are less governed by political considerations than when the aid is bilateral, a point
investigated by Rodrik (1996).
Page 75 Line 5
Replace "Grilli and Riess (1992)... countries" with:
and in attempt to construct an indicator of recipient needs, Grilli and Riess (1992) turned to the
Human Development Index (HOI) prepared by the UN Development program, combining it with
an index of external debt stocks to determine the recipient's debt burden. Trade with the donor
countries (the recipient nation's exports) was taken as the measure of the recipient nation's
commercial importance to the donor, while population size was included in order to account for
small country bias. They reported that European bilateral aid allocation seemed to be definitely
influenced by commercial motives. European multilateral aid allocations, on the other hand, are
more influenced by considerations for development needs. Grilli and Riess also showed that the
divergence between the bilateral and multilateral motive sets had increased over time, which, they
speculated, may reflect the declining role of colonial ties and other (political) factors. They did
not produce metrics for political and strategic motives, but the consensus assumption is that
security probably plays some not insignificant role in the choice of recipients and the amount and
type of aid in the post cold war global order.
Errata - p 3
Some studies (e.g. Daveri and Grilli 1991 and D'Agostino 1989) conducted on the pattern of aid
allocation among individual donors have found a polar pattern in their aid allocation. This pattern
ranges from an allocation policy guided entirely by self-interest (as with France) to one that is
directed solely by recipient interest (as with Dutch and Nordic). Some other donors were in the
middle of these extreme cases, like United Kingdom, Italy and Germany. Alesina and Dollar
(1998) in their study of bilateral aid allocation between 1970-94, concluded that the donor's
political considerations weigh more than recipient economic needs in the decision to allocate aid.
In line with the studies of the European states, others have found that the aid that flowed from
three of the largest donor states, the United States, France and Japan, tended to go largely to
'friendly' countries. Again, the aid provision was not determined by the scope of economic needs
or performance. According to Alesina and Dollar, this explains why "at best, [aid has been] only
partially successful at promoting growth and reducing poverty" in recipient countries. While
those recipients that have democratized received marginally more aid, an even more power
determinant of aid provision has been colonial ties to the donor country or political alliance with
the donor country. The authors have a lot of evidence for their claim that "an inefficient,
economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony friendly to its former colonizer,
receives more foreign aid than another country with similar level of poverty, a superior policy
stance, but without a past as a colony".
Dowling and Hiemenz (1985), Isenman (1976) and Karunaratne (1980) all observed that small
recipient countries receive relatively larger amounts of aid per capita than larger countries, a
tendency called small country bias in the literature. Some have made the case that there is also a
bias towards the middle-income LDCs.
Page 77 Line 1
Replace "A conceptually... Donors," with
Studying aid allocation by the 'sample selection models' lends more causative weight to the two-
step decision making process in choosing to allocate aid. The first step (selection stage) involves
deciding which among the potential recipient countries should be accorded aid; the second step
(allocation stage) involves determining the mechanism: the quantity and type of aid. Dudley and
Montmarquette (1976) decomposed Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid programs in
just this way. In their study, RN and DI are co-factors in the aid determination at both stages;
however, they also found evidence for the 'band wagon' effect - recipients already receiving aid
from other donors tend to be favored.
Page 77 Line 14
Replace "Other studies... for 1984-89 [in a footnote number 13]". With:
Other studies had followed this methodology by applying it a number of bilateral donors, like
Canada (Dudley and Montmarquette 1978), Australia (McGillivray and Oczkowski 1991), the
United States (Gang and Lehman 1990 and Eggelston 1987), the United Kingdom (McGillivray
and Oczkowski 1992), and Denmark (Tarp et al. 1998). Trumbull and Wall (1994) extended the
methodology to analyze total developing country aDA for 1984-89. (See Hjertholm and White
for more details)
Errata - p 4
Page 78 Line 19
Replace "For example..suggest." with:
under KFAED's charter until 1974. After changes were made in the charter and in the goals of the
organization, aid began to flow to non-Arab countries, so that one knowledgeable observer could
claim in 1984 that "Arab aid is geographically balanced out" by aid to non-Arab countries.
(Khaldi 1984: 13). However, as tables 3 and 4 suggest, this assessment is rather optimistic.
Page 79 Line 21
Replace "For another. ..with them," with:
Another determinant of DI is trade-related - that is, the notion that countries that are trading
partners are more likely to receive aid from donor countries.
Page 80 Line 6
Replace "The shortcomings... (Easterly 1999)." with:
Researchers have long criticized taking per capita income as a comprehensive indicator for the
well-being of a country (Moon 1991; Moon and Dixon 1992). If we can represent low well-being
using other parameters as well as per capita income, then using only per capita income does not
adequately reflect RN, or give us a scale to measure the need for foreign aid.. However, the
simplicity of the per capita income standard has often proven too much for researchers, who often
use it alone to assess need. After all, it is the most readily available statistic, one that requires no
field work or further quantification; and also, as some have argued, per capita income remains the
single most comprehensive index for well-being in spite of its problems. In other words, it gives
you a rough but accurate rule of thumb for signaling a country's need for aid (Easterly 1999)
Page 80 Line 23 Replace "indictor" with "indicator"
Page 82 Line 3
Replace "The existing ... allocation decisions." with:
The existing literature disagrees on whether total aid should be assessed as aid per capita, which
controls for the different population size of recipient nations, or as the dependent variable of the
fact that there is a certain amount of money and a certain number of recipient candidates; in
which case, population size must simply be one of the collateral variables that explains aid
distribution patterns. To account for the fact that, all other things being equal, China or India are
likely to receive more aid than, for example, Chad, as seems reasonable, we start out with a
potential pool of aid that comes to a fixed amount of money to be allocated, which would mean
that McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992: 1314) are correct to argue that, from the point of view of
the donor, "distributing aid in per capita terms is both a difficult and cumbersome task," and thus
not of primary concern. Instead, it is much easier for donors to divvy up the total amount of aid
available to each recipient country, firstly, according to some population-blind formula, and only
then, as McGillivray and Oczkowski (ibid.) remark, subject the allocated shares to a secondary
process of population sensitive adjustment: "aid decision makers may well be aware of the
corresponding per capita amounts, and may well adjust absolute amounts on this basis, but this is
taken to represent a response to country size. In this context, per capita aid allocations are viewed
Errata - p 5
as the outcome of this process rather than the prime consideration". Thus, donor countries commit
their aid to recipient countries firstly in terms of percentages from the whole pool, and only adjust
and modify after the initial aid projections are solidified. It is believed that choosing the variable
representing the optimal percentage of the pool of total aid available for the selected recipient
nations approximates the way KFAED undertakes its aid allocation decisions.
Page 86 Line 14
Replace "Aid ... World Bank." with:
Aid data were obtained from KFAED from inception, 1962 until 2001. These include basic
information for all projects, grants, countries and loans in their portfolio. Aid refers here to net
official development assistance (ODA). It includes grants and highly concessionalloans (that is,
loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent) minus amortization. Since the aid data are in
current Kuwaiti Dinar (KD), they have been transformed into US $ using the prevailing exchange
rate KD/$. The dependent variable is the percentage of KFAED aid that a country receives as a
share of the total annual aid budget. The dependent variable represents the output of the decision-
making process that divvies up the aid into different slices. Per capita GNI, literacy, infant
mortality and life expectancy were taken from World Development Indicators published by the
World Bank.
Page 89 Line 17
Replace "The way ... mean." with:
The complexity of the UN voting variable makes it less useful as a meaningful coefficient.
However, as pointed by Neumayer 2003d, one can say that the best case, in which a country's
votes are identical to those of Kuwait, raises its chances of receiving a grant element by about 68
percent over a country whose voting similarity value is equal to the sample mean.
Page 92 Line 11
Replace "Arab ... Arab countries." with:
Arab countries are the most likely to receive aid; they also are most likely to receive significant
aid, in comparison to non-Arab countries This is clearly evidence for the assertion that there is a
bias in favor of Arab countries.
Page 93 Line 3
Replace "Poorer countries...aid recipients," with:
Poorer countries are more likely to be selected for aid, but this fact alone doesn't predict anything
about the amount of aid. Nor is the trade variable a good predictor. Population size has an impact
on the allocation decision, which means that more populous countries are more likely to be
eligible for aid.
Page 93 Line 7
Replace "Neumayer (2003d).. selection stage," with:
This paper, and in parallel to Neumayer (2003d), deduced that ethnicity (being Arab) and religion
(being Muslim) are major factors on KFAED allocation decision. The same inference was
reached on the importance of the political alliance, as represented by voting similarity in the UN
Errata - p 6
General Assembly, in weighting on KFAED allocation decision. This makes KFAED an outlier
when compared with Western donor aid decision-making processes, which exclude weighting by,
ethnicity and religion (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Political alliance, as measured by UN voting
and a country's level of per capita income have an influence on the selection stage, but none on
the allocation stage. Thus, understanding the KFAED aid allocation process requires segregating
stage (1), of creating the aid pool and choosing eligible candidates, which is when donor interest
(DI) has the most weight, from the selection stage (2), which is when recipient need (RN)
emerges to play an important role.
Insert in the references in page 96
Henderson, Errol A.; Tucker, Richard, Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and
International Conflict: International Studies Quarterly, Volume 45, Number 2, June 2001, pp. 317-338.
Insert the following table in Page 97
Table (6): Arab, Muslim and African countries.
Arab countries
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia and Yemen. This dummy covers all countries with a majority Arab population, apart from
those Arab countries with major oil or gas reserves, which are aid donors themselves (Algeria, Iraq,
Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).
Muslim non Arab countries
Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
African
Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Rwanda, Sao Tome-Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zaire,
Zambia, Zanzibar, Zimbabwe
Source: Henderson and Tucker (2001)
Page 104 Line 8 replace "polices" with "policies"
Page 104 Line 18
Replace "From the flow... 1991-1995 period "with:
Out of the pool of all assistance funds, aid flows from developed countries to developing
countries steadily increased, despite the fact that the growth of the sum total of aid faltered after
1995 (Lensink and White, 2000 ). As can be seen in Table 12 below, the LDCs have received
higher share of these assistance funds compared to other group of recipients, both in term aid as a
percentage of GNI and as per capita. In our time frames, aid inflows to the LDCs almost
doubled, measured, again, in terms of percentage ofGDP (aid per capita). The increase went from
an average of7.6 percent (US$15.2) in the 1976-80 periods to 11.6 percent (US$29) in the 1991-
95 period, which was higher than the comparable increase in aid to the group of other low-income
countries in the same period from 2.9 percent from 2.9 percent (US$7.3) to 4.4 percent
(US$13.5). As for the rest recipient groups, there was a noticeable stagnation, and even declining
trend, in aid flow started after 1986-1990 period.
Errata - p 7
Page 105 Line 11
Replace "This figure... (Tsikata, 1998, p.7)." with:
According to the two-gap model (Chenery and Strout, 1966), this flow exceeds the required
amount to achieve a growth rate of about 4 to 5 percent per year in developing countries; yet, we
have not seen that kind of rate of growth in the developing countries since the 1980s.
In the two decades 1960-79, the median per capita growth achieved by developing countries was
a slow 2.5 percent. In the subsequent two decades 1980-98, as observed by Easterly (1999, p. 2),
it was even worse, there was no real median per capita growth among the developing countries;
almost none of the countries outside Asia registered per capita growth at or above the 1960-79
average of 2.5 percent.
There is a widespread consensus that the 1980s were the "lost decade" for LDCs, but outside of
the showcase Asian countries, the 1990s were the decade of increasing marginalization,
inequality, poverty, social exclusion, and, especially among the African countries, violence. As
noted by (Xayavong, 2002) the number of countries belonging to least developing class has
increased rapidly. Since it compilation in 1971, the number of countries that were classified as
LDC (poorest of the poor) had reached 49 in 2001. Botswana is the only country to be removed
from the list. Several African countries experienced negative economic growth in the 1980s,
despite the fact that they were receiving a substantially increased flow of aid (White, 1992a). " A
large number of countries became more aid-dependent in the 1990s than they were in the late
1970s" (Tsikata, 1998, p.7).
Page 113 Line 5
Replace "A typical... (Thorbecke, 2002)." with:
, Which typically includes the removal of subsidies and price control, currency devaluation, trade
liberalization and institutional changes at the sector level. (Thorbecke 2002)
Page 117 Line 10
Replace "As debt increases ...nation." with:
There will be little or no incentive for growth when debt increases beyond the optimal level
(Point B), after which the marginal benefits of capital decrease. In this case, the debtor is said to
be on the "wrong side" of the debt Laffer curve. It is beyond point (B), where grants will be more
beneficial in creating incentive for growth and development.
Page 118 Line 12
Replace "This argument..allocated." with:
This argument is based on the fact that current concessional loans already have a large grant
component and thus switching to grants allows resource transfer without the debt build-up that is
currently handicapping many recipient countries and eventually will reduce the debt overhang
effect. Furthermore, they argued that increasing the grant component would provide the aid
institutions greater leverage in how funds are allocated. (Anagol, 2002).
Page 119 Line 6
Errata - p 8
Replace "External..countries." with:
External assistance is categorized as either aid or a combination of concessional finance, also
known as "official development assistance" (ODA), and market-related or non-concessional
finance. Aid-flows for development purposes account for the majority of LDC external
assistance. However, LDCs often combine this with export credits and other types of non-
concessional funding.
These categories are essentially segregated by the payback requirement: grants, of course, don't
have to be repaid, while loans, the ODA component, are made on the premise that they will be
paid back.
Page 119 Line 18
Replace "Loans ... OOF," with:
Of course, the LDCs can receive other loans, too. Those which are lent by a public sector
institution (either an NGO or a state) for non-developmental purposes, or which are not
concessional, are known as other official flows (OOF). Typically, military grants will fall under
this category. So do export credits extended by donor governments or guaranteed by them.
Page 121 Line 1 delete the empty bracket ( )
Page 121 Line 11
Replace "The above... years." with:
The above reflects the loan terms at the time of commitment. The Present value is calculated on
the assumption that the loan is fully disbursed on the date of contract, from which point forward
the stream of future debt service payments is discounted.. In other words, the calculation of
future interest payments assumes a total disbursement of the loan amount, which does not take
into account that disbursements in actuality are in tranches that can take place over a number of
years.
Page 122 Line 16
Replace "As stated.. profitable." with:
As stated earlier, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD requires that all
concessional loans must have a 25 percent grant element, with the loan itself bearing a uniform
10 percent discount rate. This is the current basis used for defining ODA. However, this
definition is insensitive to the actual interest rate over the period of the disbursement, which may
actually be lower than the rate at the date the loan was officially made. In practice, this means that
some so called concessional loans may actually end up being non-concessional or even profitable.
Page 142 Line 12
Replace "The way ... mean." with:
The UN voting variable can be interpreted on the lines of what was stated previously in
chapter 2 (section 11.4).
Page 144 Line 12
Replace "The Index.. prior to 1995 [in a footnote number 36]." with:
Errata - p 9
The Index consists of 10 specific components of economic freedom. Each component is rated
(equally weighted) with a scale from 0 to 100. However, when using the index, our sample
shrinks by two-thirds due to the absence of data prior to 1995. (Footnote)
Add Footnote: For more detail see the heritage foundation:
http://www.heritage.org/index/PDF/Index09_Methodology.pdf.
Insert in the references in page 148
Anagol, Santosh; Reforming the International Development Association: Are Grants the Solution?:
Department of Economics, Stanford University, 2002
Vilaphonh Xayavong ; A Macroeconometric Analysis of Foreign Aid in Economic Growth and
Development in Least Developed Countries: A case of The Lao People's Democratic Republic (1978-
2001), Dissertation, Massey University (2002)
Tables Numbering Corrections
Page Line Written as Should read Table
95 Caption Table 7 1
99 Caption Table 8 2
71 Caption Table 1 3
100 Caption Table 9 4
72 2 Table (3) 4
100 Caption Table 1 5
87 14 Table 6 7
88 Caption Table 2 7
88 1 Table (1) 7
89 4 Table (2) 8
89 Caption Table 3 8
90 10 and 13 Table (3) 9
90 Caption Table 4 9
91 Caption Table 5 10
91 3 Table (4) 10
91 13 Table 6 11
92 Caption Table 6 11
104 18 Table 10 12
127 12 Table 12 13
130 12 Table 13 14
131 1 Table 14 15
132 2 Table 15 16
134 7 Table 16 17
135 8 Table 17 18
135 13 Table 18 19
137 1 Table 19 20
138 3 Table 20 21
139 6 Table 21 22
142 4 Table 22 23
145 1 Table 23 24
Errata - p 10
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the record of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
(KFAED) in light of changing fashions regarding the proper role and management of
such funds in the development process. The key questions addressed are whether its
concessional aid is allocated according to Donor Interest (DI) or Recipient Needs (RN),
what precisely is the grant element in KFAED loans, and whether this grant allocation is
consistent with the fund stated policy and if it is linked to one or more of the currently
held views regarding how aid should be allocated in order to be most effective - to
overcome the "two gaps," to strengthen institutions and governance or to
reward/incentivize effective macroeconomic management.
KFAED is an interesting and important subject of study for many reasons. After Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait has been the second largest Arab aid donor, having contributed a total of
more than $18.5 billion between 1960 and 2002. It In 1961, Kuwait was the first to
officially establish a bilateral aid institution: KFAED, which purports to be free of
mercantilist movies as its aid is not tied to procurement, as is the case with most
developed countries' aid institutions.
The thesis consists of three mutually dependent sections. We begin by giving an
overview of the theoretical development aid literature. We then move to empirically
investigate the allocation and analyze the concessionality of development aid from a
donor source that is underconceptualized in the literature, namely, that aid which flows
from South donors to South recipients.
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Our overview surveys the domain of theoretical and empirical development
economics since World War II. We review its evolution over time, linking successes and
failures in development aid to the refinement of macroeconomic points of view among
various schools of thought. Since the implementation of any economic policy is sensitive
to the political goals of the policy makers, we show that the evolution of macroeconomic
theory cannot, in itself, account for changes in the pattern of development aid. "Fashions"
in such aid reflect not only the past history of aid projects themselves, but also the
histories of the donor nations. Our specific interest in regional Arab geopolitical
development is contextualized in order to trace the effects of development theory
evolution on the Middle Eastern region.
Given that development aid was initially dominated by, on the one hand, the
Western powers, with their histories of empire, and on the other hand, by the Soviet bloc,
the entry into the aid arena by South-South donors presents us with questions concerning
competition or cooperation with the models developed by the existing donors. Since the
first entry of South-South donors occurred in the early 1960s, in establishing the Kuwait
Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), the major questions posed are: Did
South-South relationships create new models of aid, or did they emulate old models? If
we are "seeing" as a South-South donor does, are we aware of gaps in the development
aid network which North-South donors are missing? What stated goals were advanced
by development aid? How did these goals intersect with goals that guided the existing
donors?
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norms. In the case of KFAED (as in the case with other developing countries'
institutions, especially from the petroleum exporting countries), aid is not tied to
procurement, as is the case with most developed countries' aid institutions. Since one of
the drivers of giving aid has traditionally been the goal of achieving economic
complementarities, it is of interest that KFAED is positioned to "brag" about not trying
for the betterment of the recipients." In the vacuum left by the non-existence of economic
interest, however, other interests can rush in. Thus, the search for other implied interests
will help us to see the general strategy behind KFAED's aid allocation.
It is to this search we turn in our second chapter. Our aim is to derive a sense of
the donor's strategic interest in concessional aid in general, and to see how these interests
merge with or fall into conflict with the recipient's economic and development needs.
The larger goal of developing economic complementarities was a point of contention
during the 1960s and 70s. Structuralists and the dependency school criticized Western aid
programs as being essentially oriented towards donor economic self-advantage.
Kuwait is a test case of the altruistic model: what happens when a country can
supply aid without seeking economic advantage? One hypothesis would be that into the
vacuum of interest rush other interests, such as security. The criticism of aid as an
instrument of economic hegemony assumes a zero-sum game in which the benefit of the
donor country only comes at the expense of the recipient country. There are, of course, a
number of degrees between altruism and exploitation. Thus, we can sharpen our sense of
the justifiability of claims about the skewing away from true need created by the
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economic interests of donor countries by examining how outlier aid sources such as
KFAED define and respond to need.
We formulate the aid allocation decision as a two-stage process: selection and
allocation. In modeling these stages, we are able to detect the common factors and
characteristics that differentiate between countries that receive aid and those that don't.
Once KFAED has selected a country to receive, the allocation stage sets the quantity of
the aid going to the recipient.
Although KFAED's claims that economic disinterestedness (the absence of any
procurement mandates) distinguishes it from other donor agencies, the result shows that
KFAED's concessional loan allocation policy does not vary much from that of other
donor countries. The pattern of allocation indicates, rather, that recipients are preferred
due not only to purely economic and development factors, but also to political, religious
and ethnic factors with roots in KFAED's security-seeking framework. This reflects the
preference for regional stability as part of Kuwait's overall strategy.
In our third chapter, we go one step down the ladder in KFAED's allocation
decision process to empirically study the grant element level mechanisms. There are
major interpretative conflicts revolving around grant element analytics in the literature. In
this chapter, we attempt to settle the debate by exploring the terms in which concessional
conditions on the grant element are calculated. It is here that the pressures shaping
"competition" among donors - that is, competition among the terms of the grant that
favor the recipients - show up. Our analysis shows that the published grant element is
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inflated, and that even some concessional loans turn out to be costlier to the recipients
than market-based rate loans.
When we test KFAED's declared vs. actual allocation policy, we find major deviations
between the two policies that imply the set of real motives governing actual decision-
making are different from stated motives. We are particularly concerned that the
macroeconomic drivers of IFI aid packages, upon which KFAED's conditional lending
seems to be modeled, have failed to be seriously implemented. What this means is that
institution building and governance in KFAED's recipient band have made no inroads on
the statist form that the conditions of loaning are supposed to dismantle or reform.
Without those reforms, institutional and governances, economic growth cannot be
disentangled from rent seeking or the subsidizing of enterprises that are ultimately of
benefit to the preservation of the power structure, rather than to the opening up of
opportunity spaces in these economies. If aid is used as an external resource by the
power elite in statist economies to prop up old command-and-control structures, the aid
actually does long-term harm to the recipient country.
Applying the third stage of the decision-making process to KFAED allows us to
select out ethnicity and political factors as determinants of the grant element decision.
The result of this is that grants do not track recipient need. In fact, there is significant
understatement of grant element to higher income recipients in certain sectors like
agriculture and significant overstatement of grant element to lower income recipients,
sometimes in the same sector. To put it in practical terms, an irrigation project in Jordan
has more chance of being approved with higher grant element than a fertilizer project in
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Mozambique, even though Jordan has a higher income than Mozambique, its agricultural
potential is less than Mozambique's, and its chance for suffering from famine or near
famine conditions is much less than Mozambique's. This is an unexpected deviation from
the policies that officially govern KFAED.
We conclude with an examination of the salient macroeconomic features of the Middle
Eastern region, the major target of KFAED's funding. Given the shift to human
development measurements, with emphasis on health, education, and human rights, we
consider the question of KFAED's own situation with regard to this shift. Will KFAED
establish itself as a broker of a new set of human development norms, or will it occupy
the position of enabler, allowing nations to escape the conditions of reform necessary to
implement those reforms? We reconunend that KFAED leverage its small scale to
specialize in terms of its core competencies in the development field, such as financial
services, and that it take advantage of its broker position to cross boundaries that are
ideologically sealed to IFIs, due to the suspicion that IFIs are pursuing an agenda that
merely benefits the West.
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Given these shifts and developments in the world politics and economy, this chapter we
will provide a review of theoretical and applied development economics. It is necessary
to background this discussion with a review of the interwar period, for that period
influenced the policy choices that determined the initial framework of both the
multilateral organizations and the domestic economic policies pursued by the major
economic powers during postwar reconstruction and the first phase of the Cold War.
Since the Cold War operated as the major global political constraint in shaping the
foreign aid policies of the major blocs, we will be guided by Howard White's recent
assessment:
Until the mid-1950s the US was the only donor of note, including its role as the main
funder of the UN system. The launch of Soviet aid in 1956 started in a period of explicit
competition between the US and USSR with aid as an instrument of foreign policy
interests. Countries with colonies, notably the UK and France, became donors as they
shed their last substantial colonies in the early to mid-1960s, with others, such as the
Scandinavian countries, establishing formal aid programs by the late 1960s. Multilateral
aid, in the shape of the UN, has been present since the 1950s, but gained importance with
the growth of the World Bank and IMF from the early 1970s. (White 2002, 1)
White's summary misses, however, one historically important factor: the emergence of
OPEC countries in the seventies and eighties as providers of loans and grants to LDCs,
most notably; the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (hereafter KFAED)
In our review, we will follow a chronological approach to review the literature in
development economics:
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I.1 Introduction.
At the San Francisco conference that founded the United Nations (UN) in 1945, there
were only 13 nations from Africa and Asia. Five of the Asian nations played 'host' to
foreign troops - in other words, their sovereignty was severely limited by sponsoring
European nations. (Hurewitz, 1965) In the two decades following the founding of the
UN, a wave of decolonization changed this picture dramatically. Between 1955 and 1960,
29 former colonies joined the General Assembly. By 1994, the General Assembly had
expanded to 184 members. (Patterson, 1995) This expansion of nation states reflected
changes in the world picture caused by the collapse of European colonial empires, wars
between decolonized nations, and, in the early nineties, changes brought by the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Naturally, these events had a major impact on the international
political structure and the economic relationships between what were called, in the
sixties, "under-developed" countries (now referred to as Least Developed Countries, or
LDCs) and developed countries.
The UN was not the only international organization to emerge at the end of World War
II. Equally important was the Bretton Woods agreement concluded between the United
States and Britain in 1944 that generated the West's international financial architecture,
both by establishing rules on currency and capital flows, through Bretton Woods, and by
founding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund2.
2 In 1947, in Geneva, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established.
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1. The Marshall Plan to the Alliance for Progress (1947-1961)
2. The Alliance for Progress to the Crisis Years (1961 - 1981)
3. The Crisis Years to the present (1981 - 2001)
We will briefly review the founding of the major International Financial Institutions
(hereafter IFIs). We will examine the prototype of foreign aid, the Marshall Plan.
In our first period, we will start from Lewis' theory of the "dual economy." Within this
general framework, we will show how various schools of growth provided a theoretical
justification for certain kinds of large scale aid. While this period is marked
by decolonization, which presented, on the surface, a radical break with previous forms
of governance, the elites in the newly emerging states did not significantly dissent from
the "dual economy" consensus. Instead, they used it as a map to modernization. As we
shall see, when Kuwait emerged from its semi-autonomous status within the
Commonwealth to independence in 1961, the dual economy model was embedded in the
decision making of the most advanced Arab states -- Egypt and Syria. The dual
economy models implied that developing economies shared a certain homogeneity.
According to this viewpoint, the agricultural sector in, say, Brazil, was comparable to the
one in Morocco or in India. Geographic and cultural differences introduced only minor
modifications.
In our second period, we will show how the Harrod-Domar model, used, as was modified
by Chenery and Strout, to create both a model to forecast growth and a policy of
developmental aid aimed at filling the two gaps: the saving-investment gap and the
foreign exchange gap. we will review the structuralist school with its emphasis on
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modernization and import substitution industrialization. This school, associated with the
UN's Economic Commission for Latin America, operated to create a critical view among
third world elites in the sixties and seventies (was called Latin school of thoughts).
This period had witnessed the oil shocks of the seventies and the breakdown of the
Keynesian consensus in the developed countries, a powerful neo-classical "counter-
revolution" in development economics that criticized the dependence on state
intervention in the economic sphere. The neo-classical economists also developed models
for evaluating aid. Politically, this period was marked by two wars between Israel and the
Arab states in the Middle East, which introduced changes of status into the Arab and
North African internal political blocs. The ideological domination established by Nassar
in Egypt collapsed, and with it two distinct wings emerged. The conservative Gulf States,
on the one hand, including Kuwait, sought the goal of having Western states recognize
the validity of Palestinian claims within the established international economic order. The
more radical wing, led variously by the Libyans or the Iraqis, wanted to use oil as a
weapon to gain not only a Palestinian state, but a greater importance altogether in the
world system.
In tandem with these political events, the oil producing states became the first significant
South-South donors. The influx of funds from Kuwait and the other Gulf States
introduced a peculiar component into the political economy of foreign aid, insofar as the
donor states were not trying to develop trade complementarities with recipient states. On
the one hand, this kind of aid could theoretically have embodied a countervailing
resource to the aid from developed countries or IFIs, of which the incentive was
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ultimately self-seeking - the expansion of trade, the use of cheaper labor to lower high
manufacturing costs, etc. On the other hand, Kuwait and other South-South donors did
have political, security-seeking goals. Ultimately, Kuwait's aid in this period was not
distinguished by any major departure from the programs already set by the IFIs and the
bi-lateral aid of the Americans and the Europeans.
Our third period saw the triumph, on the one hand, during the Reagan and Thatcher
administrations, of neo-liberalism - with the world- wide drive to privatize and to knock
down impediments to the free flow of goods and services world-wide - and, on the other
hand, increasing emphasis on governance and institutions. For Kuwait and other Middle
Eastern donor states, this period was marked by the deflation of oil prices and the
consequent drying up of windfall gains. There was a lag in the shift towards human
development, attributable, perhaps, to the security-seeking nature of the Gulf state's
foreign aid programs. The structural adjustments of the eighties and the governance
concerns of the nineties directly confronted the political structure of Middle Eastern
states. That kind of confrontation was imperfectly aligned with the Gulf States'
preference for stability, which meant, in effect, that the Middle Eastern donor states
engaged in a practical competition in the terms of foreign aid agreements, allowing
recipient states to escape the magnitude of changes envisioned by IFI donors.
1.2 The interwar period
World War I is generally held to mark the end of the first wave of globalization
(Ferguson, 2005), defined in terms of four intersecting trends: a., national barriers to free
trade are dismantled; b., international capital flows, such as foreign direct investment,
enlarge to a significant proportion of total global investment; c., international legal
frameworks are arrived upon by major global powers and embodied in international
institutions; and d., falling costs in transportation and communication stimulate export
growth and international economic coordination. (Sachs, 98) It is often noticed that, by
some measures, the world economy was more interdependent, with greater FDI (Bairoch
and Kozul-Wright, 1996)3 and fewer barriers to migration (deregulating the international
labor market) in 1913 (Lal, 1998) than in the 1990s. In the period between 1919 and
1945, the pre-war consensus was shattered and international trade and finance was
dispersed among several separate frameworks.
The Bretton Woods system
The above history was on the minds of Keynes and his American counterpart,
Harry Dexter White, when they hammered out what became known as the Bretton Woods
accord in 1944. The U.S. had already been trying to undermine the "'Sterling bloc,"
insisting, as a condition of the Lend Lease program to Britain, on the elimination of all
forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce (Armstrong, Glyn, Harrison,
1991). The US was particularly anxious to take away the British advantages of favorable
concessions in Middle Eastern oil fields. To show their determination, the US policy
makers reversed the thirties trend towards state micro-management, by lifting the
gasoline rationing in the US twenty-four hours after the Japanese surrender. (Yergin,
1991) Shortly after the war, the US broke off its production and marketing protocols
3 For a comparison of foreign direct investment during the height of the 19th century British empire with
the U.S. from 1950-1982, see Oneal, John R. and Oneal, Frances H. 1988
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with Britain. However, the Allies certainly did not want a repeat of the debilitating
economic competition of the thirties. Nor did the Allies want to dismantle their domestic
policy that was formed in response to the mass unemployment of the Depression. While
New York banks pressed for the most liberalized terms they could achieve, Keynes
insisted on allowing partial state control over capital flows, as well as abridging the
market in currencies by creating a flexible but fixed exchange rate for currencies. This is
not to say that the designers of the Bretton Woods agreement did not envision
modifications in the system, or did not provide a liberalizing direction in which those
modifications would take hold.
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Europe
According to a recent essay by Irma Adelman, "the experiential roots of economic
development can be found in the reconstruction of Western Europe after the end of World
War II. There, the Marshall Plan, which financed the reconstruction of infrastructure and
physical capital destroyed by the war, led to a very quick economic recovery." (Adelman
2001, 106) This accord with the liberal Cold War view of American actions taken in the
postwar period, as W.W. Rostow remarked, "the whole process of European revival and
the beginnings of postwar growth were framed by an American policy that earnestly
sought to learn from the errors of the postwar years." In Rostow's view, the American
policy included:
* "Lowering tariffs;
* Making money available on an international scale by aid and loans; and
Encouraging, when necessary, state intervention to modify the troughs of the
business cycle." (Rostow 1978, 236-237)
Rostow's view is more valuable because of his enormously influential role, both as a
development economist and as a policy maker and advisor to various American
administrations. Among the long-term goals of the Marshall Plan was increasing the
interdependence of European economies by eliminating barriers to trade and national
subsidies, making Europe one large single market. Still, it was not the specific intention
of the planners to see European nations institutionalize a common market, as happened
later, or trans-national forms of governance separate from American leadership. (Parsons,
2002)
The other effect of the Marshall Plan was to crystallize the tensions between the
Soviet Bloc and the Western Bloc on the economic level. Marshall Plan aid was rejected
by the Soviets. Rostow sees the political dimension of the Marshall Plan as co-equal with
the economic dimension:
The Schools of Growth
"The close link between economic development and economic growth is
simultaneously a matter of importance as well as a source of considerable
confusion. There can scarcely be any doubt that, given other things, an expansion
of opulence must make a contribution to the living conditions of the people in
question. It was therefore entirely natural that the early writings in development
economics, when it emerged as a subject after World War Two, concentrated to a
great extent on ways of achieving economic growth, and in particular increasing
the gross national product (GNP) and total employment." -
Amartya Sen
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Given the history of the interwar period we have reviewed above in Section (2), the
dominant economic paradigm in the immediate post-war period modified considerably
the older, classical liberal tradition.
In the Keynesian phase of development economics, the Harrod-Domar model
seemed a perfect instrument. With it, one had a normative template for analyzing growth,
and, as importantly, relating that analysis to the concern with oversupply that pre-
occupied economists at this time. The next step was to establish, within a given LDC, the
percentile of the economy that went into different sectors, given that growth as a linear
function of the different factors constituting economic activities in agriculture, industry
and services will be composite reflecting sectorial asymmetries. W. Arthur Lewis gave
the name "dual economy" to the structural separation of the "capitalist" and "traditional"
sectors in national economies. Lewis' theory is presented in terms that presume a "stage"
theory of growth. Lewis assumed that the capitalist sector, or that of industry (services
were not, at this point, fully broken out as a separate sector), uses the low level of wages
to accrue capital necessary for further investment. In the traditional economy, however,
low wages keep workers in a steady state without adding to savings or investment
potential of owners. This derives from features of the agricultural sector in which there
are low opportunity costs for capital formation. When the natural rate of growth puts
more labor in the agricultural sector by way of pure population growth, that labor
becomes less productive. Modernization of agriculture - large-scale farming and
mechanization - squeezes out even more excess labor. Foreign aid, in this model, should
supplement domestic savings in order to finance investment in the advanced capitalist
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sector - industry - thus utilizing the capacity latent in the unproductive labor overflow
from the agricultural sector. In terms of Lewis' stages, the "turning point" in an
underdeveloped economy occurs when the excess drawn from the traditional sector by
the expanding capitalist sector, which relies on a the quantity of the pool of unskilled
labor to keep wages constant, reaches a turning point, after which the labor market
tightens and the unskilled laborer's wage is a variable upward (Truong 1976).
Two influential models of the stages of growth based on the European and
American experience were Rostow's and Gerschenkron's. Rostow, with whom the phrase
"stages of growth" is associated since the publication of his book; these stages consist of
a linear sequence of five stages broadly defining the unilateral path to development. The
five stages became a mantra for development studies in the sixties. Particularly important,
to Rostow and the policy makers he influenced, was "takeoff' into sustained growth - the
stage at which traditional economies modernize.4 Gershenkron, also used the study of the
rise of developed economies - especially Britain, Germany and Russia - to show that,
under variables some of which could not be reproduced across countries (the relative
position of the national economy within the world economy, for instance) and some of
which varied for reasons having to do with endogenous preferences in financing, there
existed a common, statistically prominent phase - a "spurt" of growth - that verified
Lewis' turning point.
4 Rostow's theory has become a veritable football for development economists. See Nicolas Craft 2001 and
Paul Streeten, 1967.
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Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) labeled this the "big push." Paul Krugman has called
this the "the essential high development model," since Rosenstein-Rodan incorporated
two assumptions into it: the assumption of economies of scale, and a premonition of
Lewis' dual economy (Krugman, 1994).
Egypt was clearly the most advanced economy in the Middle East region during
this period. The officers' revolution of 1952 advocated agrarian reform acts that followed
the classic outline of the dual economy school, breaking up large estates and encouraging
large rural landholders to invest in industry. The anti-colonial ideology of the early
Nasser regime did not exclude cooperation with the native Egyptian free enterprise
sector. The regime instituted the ISI program of raising tariffs on imported goods, while
lowering taxes on domestic manufacturers and their products. However, some have
traced the trend towards a heavy public sector role as early as 1954. In effect, the state
percentage of the GNP rose from 13% to 18% from 1952 to 1960, but the percent of the
public sector's share of gross capital formation rose from 28% to 74% -- the latter figures
reflect the true direction of the Egyptian economy. (Aoude, 1994), both Syria and Iraq
mimicked this essential structure.
As for the other states, the oil states, the critical dependency of the industrial
nations on oil was not noticed due to the relatively low price of oil in the fifties and
sixties, and its stability. The development framework of South-South development aid
was dominated by the international economic regime that accorded the donor place
exclusively to highly developed industrial nations of the North. The small aid agencies
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founded by Kuwait and in the sixties did not fit the development theory paradigms of the
period.
1.3 Alliance for Progress to the Crisis Years
The Alliance for Progress was the most publicized development plan since the
Marshall Plan. It was one of a number of development projects that were either started or
completed in the sixties. It marks the intersection of a number of schools of thought.
The sixties and seventies, in terms of development theory, can be broken down into
distinct phases. Hollis Chenery, who become a vice president at the World Bank, used his
influence to assert in his most influential views (with Alan Strout in their article)
"The possibilities of securing rapid and sustained development by effective use
of foreign assistance has been strikingly demonstrated for the past decade by
countries such as Greece, Israel, Taiwan and the Philippines." (Chenery and
Strout 1966, 679)
Anne O. Krueger, who coined the word rent-seeking to define profit taking from
unproductive activity (using a model developed by Gordon Tullock), wrote that the ways
in which the state apparatus grows in LDCs, fed by development aid, took up the
opportunities that could have been filled by more innovative, market-oriented
entrepreneurs as "competition for entry into government service [becomes] in part a
competition for rents." (Krueger 1974, 293). These shifts signified shifts in applied
development economics, away from models that promoted Industry Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) and towards Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI).
On the political plane, these two decades witnessed major changes in the
composition of international trade and finance policies. Restrictions on international trade
CHAPTER ONE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND POIICY
in capital markets were lifted in the seventies, in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton
Woods currency regime. Two oil shocks, in 1973 and 1979, created negative trends in
terms of trade for oil-importing LDCs. The current account deficit for oil-importing
developing countries is estimated to have increased more than threefold in real terms
from 1970 to1980. (Griffith-Jones and Rodriguez 1984) The boom in petrodollars
affected a major shift in donor nations, as the OPEC countries emerged as major donors,
with the rate of giving as a percentage of GDP favorable to the average among the major
industrialized countries.5 Private lending institutions, like Citibank, also rushed in. The
result was that burgeoning debt came to characterize the government budgets of LDCs
and midrange developed economies, like Argentina.
The World Bank also played an active role in this. When Robert McNamara
became president of the bank in 1968, he signaled the new, aggressive posture he
envisioned for the organization after only two weeks on the job by announcing that the
Bank would loan $11.6 billion over the next five years, which was more than it had
loaned in the past twenty. During his term as president he expanded the bank's role
among the IFI significantly. He also ended the policy of tilting lending disproportionately
towards industrialization, as per the assumptions of the dual economy model of
modernization. Under McNamara, "loans for agriculture became the fastest-growing
segment of Bank lending." However, much of that lending went to benefit large scale
farming enterprises. In a sense, the dual economy model, here, has simply been modified
s For more details, see Cohen, Charles, and Werker, Eric. 2004
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to modernize the agricultural sector, using technologies that weren't available in the
fifties. (Caulfield, 1996)
The structuralist /dependency school
The structuralist school was heavily influenced by the history of Latin America.
Two factors blinded the structuralist school to trends in development pertinent to the
Middle Eastern experience. One was the school's heavy dependence on the historical
trajectory of the Latin American economy. The Latin American resource endowment was
such that export concentration was either in products that were highly substitutable (such
as foodstuff) or subject to stocking tactics in the developed nations (such as tin). The
second was the relative stability of primary product export as opposed to manufacture
export in the postwar period. (Macbean, 1964).
Thus, the narrative of the capture of primary product exporting economies by
developed industrial economies underconceptualized the Middle Eastern experience and
misinterpreted the strategic place of oil among staples exports. The critical dependency of
the major industrial nations on oil was further disguised by the relatively low price of oil
in the fifties and sixties, and its stability. The locus for developing a framework to
understand South-South development aid should have been in the structuralist school, if
anywhere in this period. Yet here, too, theory was unconsciously dominated by a picture
of the international economic regime that accorded the donor place exclusively to highly
developed industrial nations of the North. The small aid agencies founded by Kuwait and
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Saudi Arabia in the sixties and seventies did not fit the development theory paradigms of
the period.
The dual economy model
In 1999, William Easterly published a study of the economic models used by the
IFI. He found that the Financial Gap model (his name for what is more commonly called
the two gap model) "used by over 90 percent of country desk economists of the World
Bank" although, in Easterly's view, "it [had] died in the academic literature some time
ago."
Chenery and Strout's paper can be considered both the highwater mark of
mainstream development economics and a point of departure for both the neo-classical
renewal, which was to come in the seventies and become dominant in the eighties, and
for the institutional and governance concerns that became important in the nineties.
Hollis Chenery (who served a long and distinguished career in the World Bank) was
influenced by previous case studies he had done on Greece and Israel. The Chenery-
Strout model (also called Chenery-Strout-Bruno, from an earlier form of the model in a
paper Chenery wrote with Michael Bruno) spots two "gaps" in a developing nation's
growth - investment limited growth, due to insufficient savings, and trade limited
growth, due to insufficient exports to pay for imports. Therefore, the Chenery-Strout
model, basing its aids estimates on Harrod-Domar forecasts of future growth of a given
LDC, built a model for delivering the kind of aid that could overcome the two bottlenecks
- that could, in their words, "avoid incentives to building excess capacity or reducing
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savings." (Chenery and Strout, 1966) As later critics have pointed out, while the
Chenery-Strout model improved on earlier development models by making import
capacity a separate potential constraint, and getting away from the linear capital-output
ratio assumed under Harrod-Domar, "the assumptions about the contribution of foreign
resources were not changed. It was maintained that they were exactly additive to
domestic savings and domestically financed imports." (Hansen and Tarp, 1999)
It is important to note that Chenery and Strout's paper does outline those areas
into which development economics would go, in the next couple of decades, even if
Chenery and Strout's model was treated, as Easterly implies, as an obsolete Keynesian
relic: "The central questions for assistance policy are the measurement of the
effectiveness of external assistance, the policies which recipient countries should follow
to make the best use of external resources and the basis for allocating resources among
countries" (Chenery and Strout 1966, 723),in other words, evaluation, institutional
change, and convergence - watchwords even today.
The Neo-classical counter-revolution
Neo-classical development economics produced, in Paul Krugman's words, a
"counter-revolution" in the seventies. Building on work by Peter Bauer and inspired by
Hayekian themes, neo-classical theory had three prongs: a., a critique of the
underconceptualization of "fungibility" in the mainstream theory of aid; b., a critique of
rent-seeking encouraged by state intervention in the economy; and c., a non-Keynesian
model of growth, based on Solow's Total Factor Productivity model.
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a. Under-conceptualization of fungibility. The idea that development aid can be targeted
in such a way that it is segregated from other sectors of the economy, and can thus be
considered simply additive, was criticized by Griffin (1970, 1972). Griffin maintained
that aid intended for investment may have the unintended effect of "diverting" the aid to
finance consumption or nondevelopmental expenditure, which would fail to fill the
"gaps". Furthermore, even if the aid increases public savings and investment, this may be
offset by reductions in private savings and investment. The argument about fungibility
has become a theme in negative evaluations of the relation between aid and growth. Most
recently, a cross-country assessment of growth in LDCs by Boone (1994) used data from
ninety-six LDCs over the 1971-1990 period and claimed that foreign assistance played no
role at all in growth, for just the reasons postulated by Griffin. However, in Tarp and
Hansen's survey of cross-country analyses of aid, Boone's work was considered an
outlier, with most surveys showing some positive effect from aid. (Hansen and
Tarp1999). The usual aggregation from different LDCs to form the basis for a regression
has been criticized by Pack and Pack (1990), whose single country survey of Indonesia
found that the data on fungibility was mixed: "In the largest categories [Industry, mining,
electrical power, transportation, tourism, aid is spent for the purposes for which it was
given, but the additional revenues raised by the government are allocated to those types
of expenditure least favored by foreign aid." (Pack and Pack 1990, 193)
Rent-seeking, as we have already noted, Anne O. Krueger introduced a term into
the vocabulary of development economics: rent-seeking. The models came out of the
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public choice school at the University of Chicago, which used game theoretical
equilibrium models to capture institutional behaviors, and showed an expansion of the
object of economics from strictly defined markets. The neo-classical school, being well
equipped with the informal insights of Bauer and Hayek (inspired by the classical
liberalism of Smith, Ricardo and Mill), was able to supply a trans-cultural answer to the
question of the perpetual clientelism, cronyism and corruption that emerged in LDCs by
showing that certain mainstream policies - for instance, the encouragement of inward
looking important substitution industrialization -- provided classic niches for the growth
of state-sponsored rent extraction, while incorporating systematic disincentives to
entrepreneurial behavior and innovation. The models of rent-seeking that came out of the
economics of public choice pointed in two directions: a., the importance of creating
structures of governance that would not seriously distort the allocative benefits accruing
to the open market; and b., the passage from inward-looking development assisted
policies (ISI policies, and the creation of policies designed to support Primary Import
Substitution) to Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI). EOI was advantaged, during the
seventies and into the eighties, by the shift in the donor constituency from bilateral and
multilateral aid packages to private and public aid flows, brokered through IFIs.
The neo-classical model of growth. The third prong in the neo-classical assault
was the replacement of the Harrod-Domar model by Solow's growth accounting model,
in which a national economy's total real output consists of the sum of capital and labor
inputs weighted by each factor's share in national income - plus a residual resulting from
contributions other than labor and capital. The residual is generally considered to be some
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sum of technological and organizational improvement. Policies that would favor the
residual, according to Solow's model, are going to be growth producing. Given the
argument from fungibility and rent-seeking, development aid that is directed towards
state supported economic activity will not support the residual, since it deprives an
economy of those inputs, from competition in the world marketplace, that would drive
technological and organizational improvement.
The groundwork of the neoclassical revolution, laid during this period, bore fruit
in the eighties. "The World Bank's World Development Report 1987, prepared at the
height of the neoclassical resurgence and representing the core of its views on trade
policy and the role of government. This WDR contrasts 'inward-oriented' and 'outward-
oriented' regimes, grouped into 'strongly' and 'moderately' outward-oriented: in this
simplified classification, outward orientation is associated with liberal trade policies, and
is shown to perform distinctly better. The transition from outward-oriented trade strategy
to a neoliberal government is made smoothly, glossing over issues of whether or not
outward-oriented Asian countries are really 'liberal' in their resource allocation policies.
The policy conclusion is thus undiluted trade liberalization." (Lall and Latsch 1998, 449)
Thus, the enormous conceptual shift from the policies of the Keynesian period became
inscribed in the very international financial architecture that Keynes was so instrumental
in building.
Given the neo-classical theory on incentives and the public choice investigation of
the ways the structuring of incentive sets effect national economies, the elements for an
institutional analysis of the new set of donor states and institutions that appeared in the
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND POLICYCtIPTFnNFCHAPTER ONE:
seventies can be envisioned. To do so, one must go beyond neo-classical theory, with its
set parameters of loss and gain measured in discrete, exchangeable units; and one must
extrapolate from the public choice theory investigation of immanent institutional
structures and their effects within the national system. Such a theory would try to put in
relation a nation's incentive sets and the decision matrixes that model the level of state
activity within the system of states, and its simultaneous reflection within the national
economy. In the case of the wealthy donor Middle Eastern states, there is a categorical
mix that lies outside the original development economic, which mirrored the assumption
that donor states would be major industrial states. In this framework, a state that relied
heavily on primary product export was not supposed to accumulate the surplus that would
allow for extensive foreign assistance. Thus, there was no theoretical framework for
analyzing, from the point of view of development, the windfall gain era during which
states without the classical economic infrastructures that made for trade
complementarities allocated part of their export wealth as aid.
Institutionalists have conceptualized the forces that constrain organizations,
positing exogenous factors (for instance, of rivalries within a market, or within a political
system) as well as endogenous factors (agents and traditions within the organization).
The distinction between exogenous and endogenous factors are fuzzier for larger
collectives. For instance, a state that aims at security looks at both outward enemies and
internal hostility to the elite that heads the state. These may or may not be connected.
Similarly, there are regional traditions and cross state agents to consider. Two large
shaping pressures on the Middle Eastern donors, and particularly on Kuwait, given its
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size, can be distinguished, given the insights of public choice theory. One pressure was
the attraction of entrenched forms and programs of aid already in existence, with a
history of implementation. The IFIs and the major industrial nations (both bi-laterally and
in regional blocks) had "filled in" the alternatives to aid by the time Kuwait could afford
a major donor role. These entrenched methods had been contingent on trade advantages
and the growth of that international economic system which had benefited the developed
countries. The second pressure was regional. The system of corporatist or one party rule
in the Nasserite and post-Nasser states had provided the region with stability. Stability
and security were historically drivers behind much of Kuwait's aid. The incentive set for
foreign assistance, for a country like Kuwait, embodied latent conflicts: on the one hand,
there were developmental goals that had evolved among nations seeking trade advantages
within the post war financial system; on the other hand, there were the security and
stability goals set for Kuwait by its position in the Middle Eastern region which might
encourage supporting inefficient economic regimes as a fair tradeoff for defense. Of
course, the North-South aid flow was not insulated from the security concerns of the
traditional donor nations, either, particularly during the Cold War. Still, as the IFIs turned
to structural adjustment and conditional aid, the latent contradiction in Kuwait's donor
incentives were aggravated. This meant, eventually, that Kuwait became a broker
between those states dominated by predatory institutions - those that allowed one party to
prey on the most innovative and profitable economic sectors and actors - and
developmental institutions. (Dacin, 1997; Haggard, 2004; Roland, 2004)
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1.4 The Era of Crisis up to the present
The models of development up through the early seventies had used templates
coming from a., the growth of the Soviet Union, with its emphasis on command and
control structures and autarky; and b., the Keynesian quest to modify the business cycle
through the social welfare state. The template that succeeded them, from the seventies
until the present, was the deregulation and privatization policies pursued, first, by
Thatcher in England and Reagan in the United States, and then, to one degree or another,
by other of the major industrial countries. From the fifties to the seventies, the Marshall
Plan, which apparently promoted the recovery of the European economies, was a constant
reference. This reference was supplanted, in the neo-liberal era, by the "tiger" economies
of East Asia. Gustav Ranis (1981) survey: "Employment, Income Distribution and
Growth in the East Asian Context: a comparative analysis" is the locus classicus for this
reorientation. Ranis showed that Taiwan and Korea implemented a milder ISI strategy in
the sixties, with a lower rate of protection and with greater attention to the agricultural
sector than was advised by the precepts of classical modernization. Export of land or
labor resource based products was invested back into industry. At the end of the sixties,
both economies moved into the "primary export substitution" phase, finding their
production function in the world economy.6 The controversies remain over the extent and
success of the combination of market forces and state dirigisme that organized the
successful transition and continuance in the PES stage.
6 For a summary of Ranis and a discussion of EOS, see Evans and Alizadeh (1984).
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Otherwise, the salient fact for LDCs in the eighties ("the lost decade") was chronic and
extensive crisis. As Crisp and Kelly put it:
"The flaws in the inward-looking development strategy, which evolved
after the depression of the 1930s, were only gradually revealed. Between
1950 and 1980 developing countries in Latin America grew more rapidly,
on average, than industrialized nations. However, average growth rates
masked some underlying problems that would be exacerbated by the late
1970s. First, in most of the developing world outside East Asia, extensive
government intervention made economies slow to react to international
developments, and the possibility of particularistic government policy was
an incentive for unproductive rent-seeking activities by the private sector.
In addition, these same governments were very inefficient in their
collection of taxes and had to use inflationary financing to maintain
government spending patterns. Third, the inward orientation of the
economies meant the foreign exchange supply remained dependent on
volatile primary-product markets. The oil shocks of the 1970s quickly
consumed available foreign exchange, and governments turned to
international loans to pay for petroleum and other imports as well as to
support government spending." (Crisp and Kelly 1999, 534)
The debt crises that appeared as the outward symptom of the larger depression
among the LDCs began with the Mexican default on its foreign debt in 1982, and the
structural adjustment package that was effected by a soon to be familiar consortium of the
IMF, the US Treasury and private banks. The two Mexican crises framed a series of
crises, and debt relief, structural adjustment packages, all over the underdeveloped world
- drawing in such middle ranged countries as Argentina.
The end of the Cold War, in the nineties, saw the emergence of a new World
Bank category - transitional economies. The transitional economies consisted of the
former Communist countries in Eastern Europe and Russia. These countries, the Asian
tigers, the explosive growth of China, and heady growth in the United States defined the
economic tone of the era, which was one of "animal spirits," to use Keynes' phrase.
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While the financial crises that arose in 1998, among the Asian countries, did not lead to a
world wide slowdown, it certainly dampened optimism. Finally, in 2002, Argentina - a
poster child for neo-liberal policies, ranked the "free-est" economy in the world by
Heritage Foundation in 1999 - experienced a sudden and disastrous contraction: "a
default on government debts, a nearly 75 percent devaluation of the peso, an economic
contraction that sent the GDP back to 1993 levels, an unemployment rate of 22 percent,
the collapse of the banking system despite a freeze on bank deposits, and the creation of
more than one and a half million new poor in just six months." (Corrales 2002, 29)
In the domain of development economic theory, the period under review saw the
practical triumph of the "Washington consensus."7" This had its roots in the neo-classical
growth model and the suspicion of the negative effects of state intervention derived from
public choice theory.
The linkage between growth and poverty reduction also became contentious in
this period. Already, in 1955, Simon Kuznets had postulated that income would describe
a U in the early phase of development, as labor, freed from the subsistence sector,
flooded the industrial sector. Therefore, "economic development appears to be associated
for a longer part of the process with worsening income distribution." (Braulke, 1983)
However, as income slumped in the eighties and the nineties did not show the
convergence between LDCs and developed countries predicted by the H-O-K trade
theory, the issue of poverty reduction was re-examined. The question of the conflict
between the package of structural adjustment policies (SAP) and the proclaimed goal of
7 For a history of the term by its inventor, see Williamson 2000.
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poverty reduction by the World Bank was sharply underlined in a survey by Nancy
Birdsall and Juan Luis Londofio (1997)
The existence of poverty and the lack of convergence between LDCs and
developed economies produced new approaches in this period. The "new growth theory"
contested the assumption, central to Solow, that the residual is exogenous. Instead,
theorists, led by Romer and Lucas, developed endogenous growth theories, postulating
that knowledge and technical innovation were outputs of research investment. The
institutionalists explored the theoretical consequences of the insight that "markets are
embedded in larger socio-political systems." (Gilpin, 2001)
Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP)
In an overview of World Bank trade policies, Anne O. Krueger and Sarath
Rajapatirana give the following account of the motives and mechanisms of SAP:
"With the difficulties oil importing 'inner oriented' countries were encountering
in the late 1970s, Bank policies and activities changed. The Bank moved away
from traditional complete reliance on project lending, and began devoting part of
its activities to 'Structural Adjustment Loans' (SALs). The essential idea was that
many developing countries' economies had to 'adjust' to the changing
international economic environment (including the then-high price of oil) and
shift the structure of the economies so that they could sustain growth in the face
of the need to earn more foreign exchange. As it was increasingly recognized, the
reforms of trade and payments regime were integral to future growth prospects;
reform measures came to be enumerated in SALs. The SAL itself was a quick
disbursing loan (3-4 years) with economy-wide policy conditions, usually linked
to the release of two to three tranches. In addition, the Bank began making Trade
Policy Adjustment Loans (TPALs) and Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SECALs) to
countries where objectives were focused on trade or on one sector of the
economy. Like SALs they were also quick disbursing loans. Some SECALs had
important trade policy components while some others (such as agricultural loans)
contained provisions for trade policy reforms to remove distortions that had
adversely impacted the sector in question." (Krueger and Rajapatirana 1999, 720)
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The results of the "economy-wide policy conditions" imposed uniformly on African,
Asian and Latin American LCDs have been mixed. According to Nafzinger, the "In
Africa, Bank/Fund lending to resolve external crises was usually linked to devaluation,
decontrol of prices, reduction in social spending, privatization, and increased trade, but
sequencing these adjustments often exacerbated the countries' predicament." Nafzinger
points to a further problems in the race to "primary product export growth," as inter-LDC
competition lessens return (Nafziger, 1993) thus creating a familiar bottleneck of the type
addressed by Chenery-Strout. Indeed, "[sustaining] growth in the face of the need to earn
more foreign exchange" begs the question of the residual, seeming to mix an early set of
models - of the Harrod-Domar type - with neo-classical public choice concerns, as
spending on education and social infrastructure were cut to meet SAP objectives.
An often cited study by Burnside and Dollar (2000) using World Bank data to
create a panel of 56 countries and six four-year time periods from 1970 to 1993 showed
positive effects of aid. The determinants for good economic policy track Friedman's list:
openness to trade, low inflation, budget balancing or surpluses, a relatively low
percentage of the GNP taken up by the government, and so on (Burnside and Dollar,
2000). Noticeably absent from Friedman's list is any concern with over-production or the
modifying of the business cycle - his list is temporally invariant. And thus the lessons of
the Keynesian age recede. However, such prescriptions are, of course, more popular at
the peak of the cycle - the book appeared in 1999 - than at the trough. When the United
States entered into recession in 2001, it proceeded to ignore the advice on budget
restraints and to inflate the money supply in the orthodox post-war fashion.
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Governance and institutions building
If a good policy environment is a pre-requisite to the best use of developmental
aid, then it would seem to follow that governance - the elimination of rent-seeking
behavior, the embedding of property rights in the legal system, the amelioration of class
or ethnic privileges, and respect for human rights, among other things, became part of the
standard IFI debt relief or aid package. Governance conditionalities (GRCs) became
especially important in the late eighties to the programs instituted by the IMF and the
World Bank in Africa. However, the enforcement of GRCs is problematic. "In most cases
they are dated covenants, but, unlike quantitative performance criteria, they are not
explicitly tranche release conditions. A government may promise to do a., b., c., but the
consequences of not doing so are unclear." Governance has become a policy domain of
interest not only to IFIs but to a burgeoning industry of human rights NGOs, as well as
the United States government and the EU.
There are, generally, two problems with good governance as a development aid
goal:
* It is unclear how and by what criteria different developmental aspects are
impacted by or are conceptually encompassed by the good governance agenda.
For example, is health a good governance issue? Since the World Bank is the
largest financial contributor to health-related projects, (Ruger, 2005) this is a vital
question. Yet it is unclear what trade-offs are acceptable in enlarging or shrinking
the public role in healthcare in LDCs. This takes us into mesh of commitments
that force choices between healthcare and the extension of Intellectual Property
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standards, as devised in the US, the EU and Japan and promoted by the WTO, to
LDCs, and poverty reduction. The same holds for environmental protection.
However, there is a related inefficiency in governance conditionality. The
problems of enforcement are re-enforced by the cost of monitoring and securing
good governance. Easterly brings the problems to mind with the example of a
poor person in the countryside in Ethiopia wanting to get a pothole fixed:
"The Ethiopian government looks to foreign aid for financing of public
services. This poor person somehow communicates his desires to "civil
society representatives" and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
who allegedly articulate his needs through the government of Ethiopia to
the international donors. The national government solicits a "poverty
reduction support credit" (PRSC) from the World Bank (also known as the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or IBRD) and a
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). To get loans from the IMF and World Bank, the
government completes a satisfactory poverty reduction strategy paper
(PRSP), in consultation with civil society, NGOs, and other donors and
creditors. The government prepares the PRSP in light of the fourteen point
Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDF) of the World Bank. The
World Bank follows a series of internal steps to approve a PRSC,
including the preparation of a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), a pre-
appraisal mission, an appraisal mission, negotiations, and Board approval,
all in accordance with OD 8.60, OP4.01, and Interim PRSC Guidelines.
The government also seeks qualification for the Enhanced Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (Enhanced HIPC) Initiative so that the new loan
doesn't simply go to service old loans. The creditors and the government
conduct a debt sustainability analysis (DSA). HIPC, PRSC, and PRGF
require numerous reform conditions such as participation of the poor,
poverty reducing government expenditure monitored through annual
Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs), fiscal deficit targets, revenue
mobilization targets, and structural reforms such as Civil Service Reform
Program, implementation of a Financial Information Management System
(FIMS) in government, financial sector reform in line with the Basel
standards and the eleven areas of International Standards and Codes
recommended by the IMF and World Bank..." (Easterly 2002, 223-224)
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An archaeologist of bureaucratic procedures would find, at each stage of this
cumbersome process (we have only included a portion of the total process) some
governance intention that was undoubtedly motivated by the abuses of the past. But the
sum total is a system that creates a large cost simply in the monitoring and specifying of
its own procedures. Partnering with the IFIs are LDC administrators who act within weak
agencies and institutions anyway, and whose direction of productivity is distorted to fit
with the IFI bureaucracies rather than to public service of the citizenry. It is no wonder
that, in the first study carried out of the effectiveness of the adjustment conditionality of
World Bank programs, out of fourteen countries surveyed, only three proved successful.
"Slippage" from the conditionality is often overlooked. (Dijkstra, 2002) A paradox of the
good policy environment is that, if it makes the crucial difference in the good done by
development aid, it must somehow precede that aid - and if it precedes that aid, the
socio-economic conditions that allowed for the good policy environment in the first place
might not be such as to really require aid.
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1.5 Kuwait Fund for Arab economic development
While the pattern described by the development aid provided by the Kuwait Fund
shares commonalities with the trajectory of development aid provided by the developed
countries in the postwar period, it also reflects the political and economic history of its
region. The oil-producing Arab states are in the peculiar position of being dependent on a
primary product export (petroleum) that plays a crucial role in all industrialized
economies without facing any real rivalry from synthetics or substitutes - unlike, for
example, rubber sap, which was supplanted by synthetic rubber when supply was cut off
during World War II to various industrial states, and which thereby lost its monopolistic
position in the supply reserve. Thus, unlike other "peripheral economies" [Prebish], the
major oil-producing states have had potential countervailing power in the international
marketplace, the exercise of which has been tempered since 1979, but which may well
increase as supply falls below demand.
In this section, we will give a brief overview of the entangled history of Kuwait
and the Middle East from the beginning of the fund, in 1961, with attention to the
political factors that have affected development and aid from the Gulfs oil producing
donor countries. There are two aspects of the foreign assistance relationship that bear on
Kuwait.
A. Kuwait's own interest in providing foreign assistance. As we will show, Kuwait's
incentive to provide foreign assistance is not shaped by the prospect of long-range trade
benefits, as are the bilateral aid programs of the US and Europe. Kuwait's single sector
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export economy provides a surplus that has not been used to diversify Kuwait's economic
base. Such a base would develop the potential to exploit economic complementarities that
would emerge from the development of the economies of less developed countries in the
Middle East. Instead, the surplus has gone into expanding the public sector and foreign
investment in developed economies. Thus, Kuwait's foreign assistance has to be viewed
in the context of security-seeking.
B. Foreign assistance from the perspective of rent-seeking, authoritarian regimes.
While there has been a high level of conflict in the Middle Eastern system, there is a low
level of structural political change. Democratization is low, compared to other LDC
regions (Latin America, Southeast Asia). Loans and grants have operated to preserve the
system by increasing the influence of the state sector, which in turn is taken to insure the
overall regional stability in Kuwait's interest. This can lead, in the long run, to failure, as
the stability of an authoritarian system such as Iraq's (to which Kuwait loaned heavily in
the eighties) advanced by predictable stages in the direction of an ultimately threatening
act of exterior aggression, i.e., the invasion of Kuwait. Thus the conditionality of loans
that are made by the IFIs to promote structural adjustment and reforms have a political
connotation that can make Kuwait's loans more attractive. This is balanced by Kuwait's
clientalist position vis-a-vis Europe and the United States.
We will then examine the disbursement mechanism evolved by the Kuwait Fund,
and the formative changes to the domain of Fund targets that have shifted the emphasis
on aid from grants towards the construction of traditional infrastructure projects (from the
sixties to 1980) to the years of structural adjustment (during the eighties and the nineties)
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to the signs of an incipient shift towards human capital projects (health, education and
governance).
The position of Kuwait in the Middle East.
The first oil strike in the Gulf region, at Masjid-i Suleiman in Iran in 1908, set in
motion the search for oil all around the Persian Gulf. Up until the thirties, the Kuwaiti
economy was largely dominated by the merchant class that profited from the Gulf trade.
It was a semi-autonomous British dependency ruled by the Al Sabah family. In 1934, the
first leases were taken out by the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC). Coincidentally, the first
influx of oil money came at the same time that the Kuwait merchant class mounted its
most serious attempt to unseat the Al Sabah family, in 1938. Otherwise, the Al Sabah
family has shown a remarkable cohesion and the willingness to devolve power in order to
stay in power that is unique among the ruling families in the Gulf States. (Herb 1999)
The wealth that accumulated from oil money presented a problem to the British in
the fifties, as the British sterling policy extended to its territorial dependents laws
conducive to maintaining the value of sterling as an international currency. As the oil-
producing states dollarized their petroleum market, Kuwait secured the right to a free
market in dollars and sterling, resulting in what was called the "sterling gap" - that is, the
increasing exchange of sterling for dollars reflecting the sterling's depreciating value.
Behind the concern about keeping sterling as Kuwait's main currency of exchange was a
desire for investment in the UK. This desire was behind the formation of the Kuwait
Investment Board, in 1953, which included, initially, a representative from the Bank of
England. The desire to keep Kuwait in the British zone increased after the fall of the Iraqi
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monarchy in 1958, and the subsequent secession of Iraq from the sterling zone. It was
only after the threat from Iraq to Kuwait's national independence that the British were
persuaded to support active Kuwait investment in Arab countries. (Smith 2003) Thus,
though the structures of political governance officially changed after the series of notes in
1961 that brought about Kuwait independence, the pattern of interaction between the
state and the economy had already been largely formed. The political profile Kuwait
chose to follow, up until the 1967 Arab-Israel war, was consistent with the closeness
between the ruling family and the UK, which in turn operated as a vector to other
developed countries. Unlike other Arab states in which nationalism played a major factor
in the fifties and sixties, the ruling family was able to afford a parliament and a relatively
free press without the fear of a nationalist/military coup.
To understand how Kuwait's foreign assistance policy has evolved, it is necessary
to cast a glance at the Middle Eastern and North African system. Since 1961, the Middle
East has exhibited both a high degree of conflict and a low degree of structural change in
the instruments of governance. There have been costly wars between Israel and its
neighbors (1967, 1973, 1983), the overthrow of the Shah of Iran (1979), a major war
between Iraq and Iran (1980-1989), the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (1990-1991), the
American invasion of Iraq (2003-), civil war in Sudan (1989-), civil war in Lebanon
(1975-1989), a guerilla war between Turkey and Kurdish paramilitaries (1983-1995), and
several other wars and coups. In addition, Islamic countries in Central Asia have
experienced a high degree of conflict. At the same time, the pattern of governance
common to most states in the Middle East in 1961 has remained relatively stable.
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Mehran Kamrava divides undemocratic governments in the Middle East into three ideal
types: a), exclusionary states, which govern by means of the traditional instruments of
repression (military, secret police); b), inclusionary states, which govern by using
populist symbols, rhetoric and movements to legitimate the ruling clique's
administration, while at the same time employing exclusionary instruments of repression;
and c), sultanistic states, in which some ruling family retains power. (Kamrava 1999)
Kuwait falls into the last category, along with Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Morocco.
This region-wide political dimension has two effects on Kuwait's foreign
assistance - first, on the rationale for that assistance, and second, on its effects on the
recipient states. Thtreault has noted the continuity between the client list policies pursued
by the Al Sabah family under British protection and the security-seeking policies of the
independent state of Kuwait. In T6treault's model, foreign assistance has an internal
security-seeking effect - placating potential nationalistic/Islamist opposition - and an
external security-seeking effect - purchasing a form of insurance from an assortment of
both regional and international powers in order to secure the territory of the state from
exterior threat. The starkest example of the former is the aid that was channeled to Iraq
during Iraq's conflict with Iran. This aid secured Kuwait from potential Iraqi and Iranian
aggression. When, in 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, Kuwait's investments and history with
Western countries - notably the UK - served as an entry point to rally these countries to
Kuwait's defense. (T6treault 1991, 1995)
CHAPTER ONE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND POLICY
CHAPTER ONE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND POLICY
Kuwait's role as a major oil exporter endows its bilateral foreign assistance with a
different set of interests than those that shape American or European foreign assistance
programs, insofar as Kuwait is not seeking eventual trade or economic complementarities
with its target countries.
"Kuwait's economy is characterised by heavy dependence on one sector, i.e.
mining and quarrying (mainly oil), for its sustenance. The domestic non-mining
production base is limited, with agriculture and manufacturing (which includes
petroleum refineries that constitute 67% of manufacturing's value-added)
accounting for 0.4 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively, of the country's GDP.
Most of the country's annual crude oil output and its products are exported, and
the necessary capital and consumer items, including food, clothing and durable
goods, are imported. In 1995, exports and imports of goods and services
constituted 53 per cent and 43 per cent of the country's GDP, respectively.
Furthermore, private sector activities are limited to a few economic sectors."
(Burney, Al-Mussallam 1999)
As a single-sector economy, Kuwait also exhibits a structural migration towards
overwhelming public sector employment and away from private employment, with the
percentage of Kuwaitis in the latter growing to more than 75 percent in the mid seventies,
during a period of windfall gain from oil price hikes. That percentage has risen since,
through a deep economic downturn in the eighties, through the deficits of the 90s, to the
current upturn.
"Kuwait's generous welfare system is the envy of most citizens in the
industrialised nations. The state provides its 825,000 nationals with free
healthcare and education, low-cost housing loans, subsidised essential foodstuffs,
power, water and gasoline, as well as constitutional guarantees for life
employment in governmental organisations. Indeed, between 90-95 per cent of
the Kuwaiti workforce is employed in the civil service or state owned enterprises,
including the parastatals." (Siddiqi 2001)
At the same time, the windfall gain attracted considerable in-migration, with non-
Kuwaitis filling the private employment slots. This created an unofficial regional
dependency on the oil economy as non-oil producing, labor exporting countries, like
Yemen and Somalia, swelled per capita income with remittances sent home by laborers in
the richer countries. Yemen, for instance, raised its per capita income six times with the
remittances generated by the Saudi boom in the seventies. (Chaudhry 89) If Kuwait's
strategy is to create stability in the region to preserve its own social order, its efforts to do
so can unintentionally create linkages - such as those between private workers in Kuwait
and the countries of their origin - which develop novel and unexpected benefits and risks.
Since the fifties, efforts have been made across the political systems of the region
to create regional economic integration. Inter-Arab trade never became more than a tenth
of the aggregate Arab trade total in the fifties and sixties. One reason for this was the lack
of exploitable economic complementarities. When Kuwait joined the initial committee to
create an Arab Common market in 1962, it was the only significant oil exporter among
the five states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Morocco, and Kuwait) to do so. Kuwait
eventually withdrew from the treaty that would stage the abolition of all duties between
the states, which points once again to the anomalies created by Kuwait's single-sector
economy. (Owen, 1998)
Until 1967, Egypt and Nasser's combination of state socialism and nationalism
was the dominant ideological driver behind Arab integration. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
states, hostile to Nasser and closer to the West, had not successfully exerted their
economic power to create a competing political space. As one metric of Egypt's political
power, it contributed 40 to 50 percent of the Arab League's budget. The change in the
balance of power was signaled by the Khartoum Arab Summit in 1967, which "was
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crucial in embodying the change of political poles in the Arab system. It formalized the
decline of the radical Arab order and its subservience to what can be termed 'political
petrolism.' The death of Nasser on September 28, 1970 (the ninth anniversary of Syria's
secession from the United Arab Republic) removed the nationalist's symbol and their
reference point. The resulting leadership vacuum was to be filled, almost by default, by
petro-powers." (Korany, 1991)
Kuwait joined the oil-producing states in pledging assistance earmarked for
military assistance to the "front-line" states of Egypt, Syria and Jordan at the Khartoum
conference. Collectively, these transfers were estimated at about $400 million annually in
the 1970-1973 period. However, it wasn't until the 1972 coordination of the OPEC states
in renegotiating the price of oil, and the OAPEC oil embargo of 1973, that the petro-
powers showed both their political muscle and ushered in the era of windfall profits. The
OAPEC powers were not, however, undivided. While the 1973 embargo succeeded
because the conservative Gulf states - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE - joined the
more radical states, Libya and Iraq, the conservative states never intended the embargo to
do real injury to the international economic order, and were receptive to signals from the
United States after the Yom Kippur war that they took as a modification of the pro-Israel
stance taken by the Americans. (Ahrari, 1979)
The embargo had two results: on the one hand, it ushered in an era of windfall
profits for the oil-producing states. On the other hand, by driving up the price of oil, it
created a balance of trade crisis for developing states, among which were several Arab
states.
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There were four possible strategies for the windfall gains by the oil-producing
states: a), foreign investment; b), foreign assistance; c), expansion of government
services; and d), domestic investment. The division between these four possibilities
depended on the state's degree of in-migration, its geography, its security needs, its
endogenous population growth, and the size of its domestic market. (Hazleton, 1978)
Kuwait had the means to accomplish its security-seeking goals both internally - in terms
of an expanded public sector - and externally - in terms of foreign investment and
assistance. Foreign investment, here, does not entail, as it does with other developed
capitalist states, investment by private businesses headquartered in those states. Rather,
foreign investment has to be looked at through the peculiar status of Kuwait businesses,
which operate as both independent entities and as parts of the state. Thtreault, in studying
the reaction of the Kuwaiti Petroleum Corporation to the invasion of Kuwait, has aptly
used the analogy to the medieval theory of the king's two bodies, with the state serving as
the king's metaphorical body. Similarly, the boundary between KPC as a corporate actor
and KPC as a state actor is attenuated to the point where it can operate as one or another
in succession, or both simultaneously. Thus investment by Kuwait can function
strategically as private investment or state policy. (Thtreault, 1999)
On the other hand, the volatility of revenue depending on petroleum export makes
it very hard, however, to project any trend into the future. Unlike countries with other
primary product exports, where the economic landscape can only benefit from
diversification, the benefit from diversifying given the surplus provided by oil price
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upswings is harder to argue for. So far, there is no predictive model for a recurrent,
cyclical windfall economy of the oil producing type.
The recipients: benefits and rent-seeking
In the sixties, development in the Middle East followed the standard
modernization model. This model - heavily oriented towards large-scale infrastructure
projects and import substituting industrialization - dovetailed with the corporatist
mentality of the various ruling cliques. "In this early populist phase, the state drew the
existing but still weak working classes and urban middle classes into its rank in order to
mobilize the human resources of the country, and their political support, behind its
development strategies. In return for their support, the state offered them welfare services
and production and supply of new consumer products." (Ehteshami, Murphy 1996) The
countries of the Middle East and North Africa suffered, in the seventies and eighties, the
same convergence of two problems that have globally effected LDCs: the stagnation of
those economies structured by development strategies of the sixties, and the shock of
negative terms of trade following the seventies oil spikes. The structural adjustment
demand by the IFIs and Western donors was a powerful force for liberalization in the
eighties and nineties among other LDCs, since they were designed to diminish the rent-
seeking that enable ruling elites to contain rivalries and opposition groups. Yet the
Middle East lagged behind on these trends. In a case study of Syria, Hinnebusch has
shown how the ruling clique has to balance political and economic rationality. If
liberalization is to succeed, the bourgeoisie, the entrepreneurial private sector, must be
freed from constraints on its business activities. But the ruling elite, based in the public
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sector, views the bourgeoisie as a rival. In addition, the popular base of the regime
(unionized workers, public employees, and small property-holding peasants), are likely to
be threatened by market reforms. The regime has responded with a strategy of
incremental liberalization and transitional alliances between segments of the
entrepreneurial class and the military to cushion the political impact of the structural
changes. In addition, it has used the cushion provided by upward swings in oil wealth and
Arab aid to sequence and control its policy of selective liberalization. (Hinnebusch 1997)
Is having a competing market for aid - South-South aid - important to the stabilization of
the system? Is it the one of the intentions of Kuwait's foreign assistance policy?
In the 1984 statement of the project appraisal criteria and financing policies of the
Kuwait Fund, the advantages of Arab Aid are overtly tied to Kuwait's disinterestedness,
as an oil producer, and the non-interventionist, non-political nature of the aid, noting that
funding
"... is essentially highly concessional and non-tied. Being non-tied, it offers the
opportunity to recipients to procure the desired quality of goods and services
from the lowest cost source. Not only that, but it frees the beneficiaries from
committing themselves to project designs and technologies that may not be the
most suitable to their needs and circumstances. Thus, it can be safely claimed
that Arab aid with no political, commercial or similar strings attached to it
possesses all the qualities that are highly desirable for increasing aid
effectiveness." (Kuwait Fund 1984)
Behind the rhetoric, what seems to be on offer here is the kind of aid ideally
suited to preserving the status quo power relations in states that are growing short on
those resources that would preserve non-democratic rule based on inclusionary populism.
However, it is a real question whether or not it can be the case that aid is effective when it
is simply inserted neutrally in a system of institutions that are structured by a high degree
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of rent-seeking. In a 1976 study of the Kuwait Fund, Demir wrote that Kuwait "projects
an image of political and ideological neutrality." (Demir 1976) In the framework of
security-seeking, the Kuwait Fund does well to capitalize on that image. In that sense, the
competition with the IFIs provided by the Kuwait Fund and other of the oil producing
countries aid programs may well contribute to the lag in the liberalization of Middle
Eastern and North African countries. If foreign aid disguises the cost of unsustainable
political activity, it can be classified as a moral hazard just as much as insuring a risky
investment can be so classified. Instances in the Middle East could include Israel (with
US aid cushioning the Israeli population from the cost of the West Bank occupation)
(Lustick 1982) and Egypt (with multiple sources of aid, the Egyptian ruling elite has been
able to ward off reforms that would destroy the Nasserite one-party system or neutralize
its inclusionary basis among the population by welfare reforms) (Glasser 1995).
However, behind the neutrality, Demir notes that the Kuwait Fund has evolved to
tighten controls and challenge corruption in the assistance process. "Since corruption
cannot be ruled out as a symptom of economic and social life in the Middle East, a tighter
control on the use of Funds by the Fund has both economic and political advantages."
(Demir 1976) This evolution is mirrored in the funding process, which we will now
survey
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The Kuwait Fund: evolution of the process
According to a 1984 Kuwaiti Fund overview, the Fund's "appraisal pipeline" is
structured like this:
a. A project is submitted by the government of a country within the Fund's
ambit for consideration.
b. The project is considered from the point of view of its design and
function. If the project seems well designed, it is next judged as to its
feasibility and the availability of resources (technology, human resources,
and other sources of funding) to ensure its completion. The Fund is
willing to supply the expertise to make these evaluations and projections
in cooperation with the potential recipient.
c. Criteria examined include poverty alleviation and need, but do not
include governance. The Fund highlights its neutrality, in fact: "It [the
Kuwait Fund] does not concern itself with the social and economic
orientations of the recipient country so long as any measures taken by
such recipient do not affect the success of the development operation in
question."
d. Financial criteria are described as follows: "While economic appraisal is
made from the perspective of the country's objectives, financial appraisal,
on the other hand, is concerned with the financial viability of the
investment and its effect on the financial position of the project-operating
entity. Thus, such measures as the Internal Financial Rate of Return
(IFRR), the debt service ratio, the debt-equity ratio, the current ratio, the
average rate of return on gross fixed assets and net fixed assets, and other
financial measures are computed and evaluated to determine the impact of
the proposed operation on the financial soundness of the entity. The
financial analysis and projections are undertaken not merely as an
exercise, but as a means for guiding the most appropriate steps, actions
and measures that could be implemented to ensure a sound and viable
financial position which enables the entity to perform smoothly and
steadily."
The typical projects funded by the Kuwait Fund up through 1984 were largely
industrial, agricultural or infrastructural. Human capital projects involving health,
education, and research and development were not blocked out as distinct parts of KF aid
and loan disbursement, nor were environmental considerations prioritized. The 1984
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guidelines admittedly anteceded the World Bank and UN led turn to Human
Development (HD). However, Human Development grants must be given a different
portfolio and framework of assessment and cooperation if they are to succeed. Perhaps
the orientation to HD funding has been difficult for bilateral donors - for instance, as
funding for education by the World Bank has doubled in the 1986 to 1998 period,
bilateral funding has been volatile, with a downturn in the period from 1990 to 1993.
(Alexander 2001). Education grants for curriculum development, school building, and
educational manpower are harder to design to fit the KFAED's preferred neutral or
stabilizing intervention model, since such projects invariably run into question of gender
and income disparities that are less visible in designing infrastructural projects. Similar
questions arise with projects involving health, research and development, and the
environment - all of which bring in questions of governance. At the same time, the need
for HD funding is growing - for example, it is estimated that funding to sustain primary
education in the Middle East and North Africa to accommodate the population will have
to grow by a third. How Kuwait's traditional security-seeking foreign assistance
programs accommodate these new opportunities and threats is a question that requires
looking more closely at the political economy of the KFAED
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Abstract
This paper is a study of aid allocation by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
Development (KFAED) from1974 to 2001. It seeks to determine, among other
things, whether the allocation of aid reflects recipient needs (RN) or donor
interests (DI). It includes: (i) a review of Kuwait Fund operations; (ii) a
review of the aid allocation literature; (iii) constructing the hypotheses
regarding KFAED's aid allocations, and (iv) a formulation of an
Econometric model to explain the allocation process of aid. The paper will
use a two stage model, the first step is whether to select a country or not, and
the second involves how much aid to commit. The empirical analysis
demonstrates that income, ethnicity, religion and politics are all factors in the
selection stage. Both the ethnicity and religion of the recipient and more
populous countries have an influence on allocation stage.
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II.1 Introduction
The Development aid literature has focused, in general, on either estimating the
recipients' needs or assessing its impact on the recipient, while the literature on aid
allocation deals with both determining the aid size and the motives behind its allocation.
Given the importance of studying the impact of aid on development, it can not be
achieved without understanding aid allocation process and motives; how much aid is
allocated and to whom (Tarp et al 1998).
Additionally, given the vast research that has been conducted in the literature, there is
little literature covering Arab aid. This gap creates a genuine need for applying this
research to Arab aid allocation. Therefore, the research focuses on investigating the
allocation and the factors that determine grant allocation policy. Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development will be used as a case in our analysis. Examining the volume of
aid during the last few decades shows its importance as the largest and oldest Arab
bilateral development institution.
The above importance stems from the fact that Arab aid had reached close to $120
billion in 2004, representing almost 1.3 percent of their GNP and 13 percent of total
world aid. Some researchers had attributed this gap to the lack of accurate published data
on the part of Arab developmental institutions. But in recent years, Arab donors started
publishing their data and statistics, making feasible the potential of filling the gap in the
literature.
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This paper will analyze how the Kuwait Fund for Arabic Economic Development
(KFAED, hereafter) aid allocation has evolved since the early 1970s. This is of particular
interest due to the widespread perception that the aid policy of Kuwait, as a small
developing donor country, is driven largely by the development needs of poor countries
rather than by more self- interested and political motives. An econometric model for the
allocation of KFAED concessional aid is proposed in this paper. We present the
allocation decision as two stages involved in the aid allocation process, namely: the
decision to grant aid or not, and then, if yes, how much. These two steps will be explicitly
modeled in order to capture and explain the relationship between them and KFAED
decision process. The literature of aid allocation will be applied to derive conclusions
about the significance and parameter signs of the different officially stated motives
behind KFAED's allocations during the period 1974-2001.
Following this introduction, Section II provides a descriptive analysis of Kuwait
aid in a historical perspective. In Section III, existing literature is reviewed, along with
the hypotheses about Kuwait bilateral aid selection and distribution among recipient
countries. This framework is made quantifiable in Section IV, and the empirical analyses
are summarized in Section V. Concluding observations
II.2 Kuwait AID8
After Saudi Arabia, Kuwait was the second largest Arab aid donor, having
contributed a total of more than $18.5 billion between 1960 and 2002 (Table 1). In 1961,
8 Draws from a survey from Imady (1982)
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Kuwait was the first to officially establish a bilateral aid institution: KFAED. In terms of
GNP, Kuwaiti aid has ranged from 3% in the 1980's, 5% in the early 90's and around 1%
in 2002, well above the UN mandated .7% , and well exceeding all western donors. As
figure 1 show.
Kuwait contributes aid through three main channels: The Ministry of Finance; the
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and the General Board for the Gulf and
Southern Arabia ( Imady 1982).
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED):
Established in 1961, KFAED was the arm for extending concessional loans to
finance development project to Arab and other developing countries. KFAED was an
independent agency with an initial authorized capital of Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) 50 million
($140 million), it increased to KD 2 billion ($7.2 billion) in 1981. Its paid-up capital at
the end of June 2003 was KD 2000 million ($7.2 billion), and it had an accumulated
general reserve amounting to KD 1.453 billion ($4.8 billion). (KFAED annual report
2003)
The stated purpose of KFAED is to assist Arab and other developing countries by
providing loans on concessional terms for specific projects that are likely to have a
favorable impact on the borrower's economic development, while yielding a satisfactory
rate of economic return. Until 1981, the Kuwait Fund's activities were limited to loans
and relatively small technical assistance grants. A new statutes adopted in 1981 also
enable the KFAED to participate in the capital stock of development-oriented
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corporations controlled by developing countries and of international and foreign
development institutions assisting developing countries.
At the end of 2003, total loan commitments totaled $11.8 billion for a total of 631
loans, most of which were on concessional terms (Table 2 and figure 1 show annual
KFAED loans). Up to 1974, KFAED lending was limited to only Arab countries;
however, following the 500% increase in its capital, lending activities accelerated after
1975. The peak level of commitments occurred in 1981-82 following a 100% increase of
its capital and the adoption of the new statutes. The level of commitments fell to slightly
more than $300 million per annum since 1984. However, and as figure 1 shows, loans
picked up just before the invasion of Kuwait and continue to grow through the nineties
with the exception of 1994 when the loan commitment declined below 250 million
dollars.
KFAED disburses loans relatively quickly. Its loan utilization ratio (percentage of
gross disbursements to total committed loans) stood at 75 percent at the end of June 2003,
higher than for most other Arab development agencies. Cumulative gross disbursements
amounted to KD 2532 million ($8.1 billion) as of June 30, 2003, and cumulative loan
repayments were about KD 1298 million ($4.2 billion). Net loan disbursements have
displayed a relatively regular trend, growing from a small amount in 1973 to a little more
than $200 million annually in 1976-79. It increased to an average of $325 million per
annum between 1980 and 1986. In 1987, concessional disbursements fell to $88 million.
In 1988, for the first time, repayments exceeded disbursements, totaling a minus $6.5
million. This worsened in 1989, with net disbursement being a negative $12.5 million.
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The increase in the level of new commitments in 1989 for the first time in seven
years was expected to increase the disbursements in the years ahead, but KFAED's
operations were disrupted by the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. However, KFAED
was able to operate from London the same month. As a matter of fact, it continued
committing loans during the occupation where over 400 million dollars were committed
in 1990, the year of the invasion, compared to slightly more than 270 million dollars in
1989. After the liberation, KFAED decided to include two regions into its recipients, The
newly independent stated from former Soviet Union and Latin America. Furthermore, as
he following table shows, KFAED average annual loans have increased in the 1990's to
in access of 450$ million compared to 330 $ millions in1980's.
Table 1 KFAED annual loans (decades) in US $
Decade Annual Loan
1960s 24,451,355
1970s 176,449,081
1980s 332,179,623
1990s 458,658,091
2000s" 461,726,893
In addition to loan disbursements and small technical assistance grants, the
KFAED contributes part of its capital for participations in multilateral development
institutions in the name of the State of Kuwait; a total of KD 285 million ($950 million)
was disbursed by 2003 for this purpose to Arab fund, ADB, the African Development
Fund, BADEA, the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation, and IDA. (KFAED
internal memo)
9 Up to 2003.
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Although the KFAED has been allowed to lend to non-Arab developing countries
since July 1974, and 65 countries have benefited from its aid, as table (3) shows, the
geographic distribution of its aid flows has remained heavily tilted toward Arab
countries, representing on average 50.9 percent of the total in 1989, and increased to 52.6
percent by 2003. The second largest beneficiary has been Asia; however its share had
declined from 28.7 percent to 20.6 percent in 2003, followed by Africa (17 percent),
Central Asia (6.4 percent) and Latin America (2.4 percent). Table (4) shows the sectoral
distribution of loans indicates a clear preference for infrastructural projects, which
accounted for more than 60 percent of commitments between 1962 and 2003.
Agricultural and industrial projects, along with energy and other projects made up about
20 percent each of the total. In particular, since the inception of the Kuwait Fund, the
transport and communications sector ranked first with a share of 30.5 percent in 1989 and
increased to 35.1 percent by 2003, followed by electricity (23.3 percent in 1989 to 22.3 in
2003), agriculture (21.2 percent in 1989 to 21.2), industry (17.7 percent in 1989 to 13.3
percent in 2003), water and sewerage (6.6 percent in 1989 to 11 percent in 2003), and
other sectors (0.7 percent in 1989 to 1.9 in 2003).
Table (5) shows the KFAED grant element has increased from 38% in 1960's to %48.47
in 2003. In similar fashion, the KFAED average loan amount has increased from 9$
million per loan to more than 23$ million per loan in the same time period.
KFAED is often ending coordinating aid policies originating from Arab
institutions. As of June 30, 2003, 631 projects had been co-financed with one or more
development institutions and joint financing was an element in an estimated 55.3 percent
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of the total value of the loans extended by the KFAED. Furthermore, it represents Kuwait
in a number of Arab and international multilateral development organizations, as well as
in the World Bank consultative groups for several countries and in the Development
Committee. Finally, it supervised 28 grants extended by the State of Kuwait to a number
of Arab and sub-Saharan African developing countries, with a total value of KD 93
million ($300 million).
II.3 The Basis of Aid Allocation: Literature Review1 o
The aid allocation literature seeks to explain the interests and motives of donors
by collating patterns in the allocation of aid with the stated policies of the donor
institution or state. The aid literature considers foreign aid assistance as an instrument to
be facilitated to help accomplish a number of objectives; economic, political, as well as
humanitarian and development ones. The basic assertion of aid allocation literature is that
in pursuing these objectives the donor is motivated to allocate their foreign aid in such a
way as to maximize the benefits of attaining these objectives. Since actual motives, not
the declared ones, they are not directly observable, explanatory analysis aims at the
decision-making process of turning motives into allocations. The assumption is that aid
will be allocated to those recipients who exhibit characteristics (economic, political,
strategic, or other), which are believed by the donor to be a., worth targeting, and b., to be
amenable to such behavioral changes as would be consistent with its own interests. The
10 Draws on the survey paper by McGillivray and White (1993a). See Hjertholm, P and White, H (2000) for
more detail survey.
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methodology thus involves establishing viable hypotheses relating aid flows to the
observed characteristics of recipient countries and donors' other motives, (see
McGillivray and White 1993a).
Earlier explanatory studies, (e.g. Wittkopf (1973), Mckinlay and Little (1977;
1978a, 1978b; 1979), McKinlay (1978), Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and Tsoutsoplides
(1991)), treated recipient needs (hereafter RN) and donor interests (hereafter DI)
separately, by modeling each of the two models of aid allocation as stand alone. The RN
model assumes a need-based perspective on the part of the donor, positing the economic
and social requirements of recipient countries need as the sole determinants of aid
allocation. On the other hand, the DI model takes a different interest-based perspective,
assuming that donors allocate aid for the purpose of promoting their foreign policy and
strategic objectives and/or economic self-interest. The general result of the empirical
evidence in the three decades prior to the 1990s suggests serious doubt about the extent to
which the recipient need model can explain aid allocations from bilateral donors. Not
unexpectedly, however, multilateral aid allocation was comparatively well explained by
the RN model estimated by Maizels and Nissanke (43 per cent of the variation). This may
be partly explained by the fact that multilateral agencies are less governed by political
considerations than bilateral agencies, a point investigated by Rodrik (1996).
With regard to the US bilateral aid, Mckinlay and Little (1979) reached a similar
conclusion, claiming that US foreign policy considerations almost always trumped
humanitarian concerns to explain the course of US aid allocation, However,
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Tsoutsoplides (1991), found that the DI model was a worse predictor for total European
aid than the RN model, although the reverse is true when only bilateral aid is considered.
A different approach of study aid allocation has applied so-called 'hybrid models', a
comprehensive model which encompass both RN and DI into one model. In applying this
model on European Aid,. Grilli and Riess (1992), for example, used the Human
Development Index (HDI)" as an indicator of recipient needs, with external debt stocks
added as an additional indicator of debt burden. Exports to donor countries measured
commercial importance, while population size was included in order to account for small
country bias, his results indicate that European bilateral aid allocation is influenced by
commercial motives. European multilateral aid allocations, on the other hand, are more
influenced by considerations for development needs. Reflecting on the reasons for the
generally better explanatory power of the applied model over time, Grilli and Riess
suggested the declining role of colonial ties and other (political) factors. Political and
strategic motives are not explicitly tested for, but while the extent to which these factors
influence aid allocations has diminished since the demise of the cold war, security
consideration may nevertheless have played a role in some cases.
Yet other studies (e.g. Daveri and Grilli 1991 and D'Agostino 1989) on the
allocational pattern of individual donors found evidence of a 'polar pattern' among them.
At one end, French aid appeared entirely guided by French interest, and at the other,
Dutch and Nordic aid appeared to be driven almost wholly by recipient needs.12 In
' Whether or not the Human Development Index is a suitable indicator of development is a moot point.
12 A recent study on Danish aid by Tarp et al. (1998), while confirming the importance of recipient needs in
the determination of Danish aid allocations, also found evidence of commercial interests, as well as
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between these contrasting cases were found donors like the United Kingdom, Italy and
Germany. Supporting the notion of a very diverse pattern of aid allocation among donors,
the recent study by Alesina and Dollar (1998) of bilateral aid allocation during 1970-94,
found evidence "that the direction of foreign aid is dictated by political and strategic
considerations, much more than by economic needs and policy performance of the
recipients". Aid from the United States, France and Japan (accounting for a very large
share of total aid) largely went to 'friendly' countries, regardless of economic needs and
performance, with Nordic aid much more sensitive to these factors. The authors propose
that this pattern of aid flows partly explains why past aid has been, "at best, only partially
successful at promoting growth and reducing poverty" in recipient countries. While
recipients that have democratized have, at the margin, received more aid, colonial past
and political alliances have been the major determinants of aid flows. The authors
paradigm claim is that "an inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic
former colony friendly to its former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another
country with similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a
colony".
A couple of studies (e.g. Dowling and Hiemenz 1985, Isenman 1976 and
Karunaratne 1980) have highlighted and sought to explain the small country bias often
observed in donors aid programs (there also being a possibility of middle-income biases),
which means the tendency for small recipient countries to receive relatively larger
amounts of aid per capita than larger countries.
increased political pre-occupation with human rights. Evidence of an increased role of political
developments in recipient countries has also been found by Alesina and Dollar (1998).
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A conceptually different method is proposed in studying the aid allocation by the 'sample
selection models' The idea is that aid allocation process is a two-step decision-making
process. The first step (selection stage) involves deciding which countries to include in
the aid program, and the next step (allocation stage) involves determining how much aid
the countries selected will receive. Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) used this method
in studying Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid. . They found both the
selection and allocation stages to be influenced by RN (i.e. income per capita and
population size), and on DI (i.e. economic and political self-interest, and on the 'band
wagon' effect- the tendency to allocate aid to countries already receiving aid from other
donors. In his recent paper, Neumayer (2003) confirmed the intersection between RN
and DI when applied the approach on total Arab aid. His result documents that being
poor, Arab, Muslim, African, and having political ties will result in obtaining aid from
Arab multilateral institutions.
Other studies had followed this methodology by applying it to bilateral donors,
like Canada (Dudley and Montmarquette 1978), Australia (McGillivray and Oczkowski
1991), the United States (Gang and Lehman 1990 and Eggelston 1987), the United
Kingdom (McGillivray and Oczkowski 1992), and Denmark (Tarp et al. 1998). Trumbull
and Wall (1994), using also an extended version of the Dudley-Montmarquette model,
performed an analysis of total developing country ODA for 1984-89.
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Factors determining Kuwait aid allocation
The existing literature that deals with Arab aid allocation had mentioned many
factors that may have some influence on the direction and volume of Arab aid.
Kuwait as having a majority of Muslims would naturally extend aid to Muslim countries
than not. This religious preference is argued by Mertz and Mertz (1983) in that Arab
donors are biased with respect to Islamic countries. However, Khaldi (1984: 13) rejects
the suggestion that Islamic countries might be favored by Arab aid in claiming that 'Arab
aid does not have any religious character'. Porter (1986: 63), on the other hand, believes
that the 'Islamic connection', while existent, 'appears to be of relatively small
significance among the motivations underlying the Arab aid effort and its distribution'.
Therefore, the hypothesis states:
Hypothesis I: The recipient being a Muslim country will be a positive factor in KFAED
aid allocation
From its name, KFAED has begun its lending activities limited to Arab only
states. At least in the early years; Arab countries were the sole beneficiaries of KFAED's
aid (Van den Boogaerde, 1991). For example, only Arab countries were eligible for the
receipt of aid from the KFAED until 1974. However, generally speaking, eligibility and
the range of recipient countries widened substantially after the very early periods of Arab
aid allocation. Already in 1984, Khaldi (1984: 13) claimed that "Arab aid is
geographically balanced out" and is not heavily biased towards Arab countries. However,
this "balanced out" is not clear in KFAED case, as tables 3 and 4 suggest. The hypothesis
states:
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Hypothesis II: The recipient being an Arab country will be a positive factor in KFAED
aid allocation.
In addition to Arab, some suggest (Neumayer 2003d) that being sub-Saharan
African country might influence KFAED allocation decision. This stem from the fact that
the Arab League was and still in pursuit of Afro-Arab unity. In addition to that, there is a
traditionally strong political, historical and cultural links between African countries and
Arab countries (Simmons, 1981). The third hypothesis states:
Hypothesis III.: The recipient_being an African country will be a positive factor in
KFAED aid allocation.
From the DI, it is expected that Kuwait will favor countries that have policy
positions similar to theirs. Such an indicator can be the similarity of United Nations
voting behavior of Kuwait and the recipient.
Hypothesis IV: The United nation voting behavior of the recipient in relation to Kuwait
will be a positive.factor in aid allocation of KFAED.
Another factor that might impact the DI that is often employed in the aid
allocation literature is some trade-related proxy. The idea of using such a variable is that
donors might be more willing to give aid to countries that are major trading partners with
them. The hypothesis is:
Hypothesis V. The level of trade between the recipient and Kuwait will be a
positive factor in aid allocation ofKFAED.
Recipient Needs (RN) Factors
The single most common and most relevant indicator variable of RN included in
studies of aid allocation is a country's level of income. It represents the income of the
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average citizen. The lower this income is, the poorer on average a country is and
therefore the more in need of aid. In its guidelines on developmental aid, KFAED states
clearly that aid should be concentrated on the poorest countries.
Of course, income is an imperfect indicator of RN average income levels as it
does not tell anything about the distribution of income, nor is income everything that is
relevant for the welfare of people. The shortcomings of per capita income as a
comprehensive indicator for the well-being of a country have long since been recognized
and criticized (Moon 1991; Moon and Dixon 1992). If low well-being reflects high need
for foreign aid, then using only per capita income as a variable does not adequately
reflect RN. In spite of this, the existing literature has often only used per capita income,
first because it is more readily available than many other potential candidates and second
because some do argue that, in spite of its problems, per capita income remains the single
most comprehensive index for well-being and therefore for signaling a country's need for
aid (Easterly 1999). KFAED, like many other aid donors, might take the need of potential
recipient countries into account in favoring poorer countries. For example, KFAED's
former Director Al-Humaidi (1984: 60) claims that it has been the general policy of
Kuwait Fund to favor "those countries of the developing world which are more in need of
assistance than others". The hypothesis states:
Hypothesis VI: The higher income recipient has the lesser chance of aid allocation from
KFAED.
To take into account development needs of the recipient, beside the above
mentioned economic indictor, an index comprising both the health and education of a
country. One of the indexes is called the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI). It is used
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here in addition to per capita income. It was first developed by Morris (1979) in a report
published for the Overseas Development Council and has been used for example by
Maizels and Nissanke (1984) in their early analysis of bilateral and multilateral aid flows
and by Tsoutsoplides (1991) on EC aid allocation. The PQLI is an aggregate measure of
life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy. The hypothesis states:
Hypothesis VII: The higher a recipient's development need as represented by
PQLI the higher the aid allocation ofKFAED.
11.4 Research design
In accordance with the vast majority of the literature, aid in our study refers to
loans with grants --highly concessional loans (i.e. loans with a grant element of at least
25 percent ) that are "undertaken by the official sector", administered with the
"promotion of the economic development and welfare" of the recipient countries as its
main objective (OECD 2002b: 294).
Our classification, in this research, of aid is aid commitment (decided) and not
aid disbursed (actual). Commitments are defined by "a firm obligation expressed in
writing", whereas disbursements "record the actual international transfer of financial
resources"(OECD 2002b: 292). We argue, as White and McGillivray (1995), that
commitments are the more relevant variable if we need to analyze the determinants of aid
allocation by donors, as commitments are "the decision variable of the donor" over which
they exert full control.
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The Dependent Variable
The existing literature disagrees on whether total aid should be the dependent
variable or aid per capita. The latter controls for the fact that countries differ in their
population sizes. If total aid is taken to be the dependent variable, then at the least
population size must be one of the explanatory variables to account for the fact that, all
other things being equal, China or India are likely to receive more aid than, for example,
Chad. In most cases, it seems reasonable to presume that there is an overall fixed amount
of money to be allocated. Given this overall constraint, McGillivray and Oczkowski
(1992: 1314) are correct in arguing that "distributing aid in per capita terms ... is both a
difficult and cumbersome task" as care needs to be taken neither to overshoot nor
undershoot the fixed overall amount of money available. It is much easier for donors to
allocate a share of the total amount of aid available to each recipient country. As
McGillivray and Oczkowski (ibid.) point out, in this process of dividing the cake "aid
decision makers may well be aware of the corresponding per capita amounts, and may
well adjust absolute amounts on this basis, but this is taken to represent a response to
country size. In this context, per capita aid allocations are viewed as the outcome of this
process rather than the prime consideration". Therefore, the amount of aid committed to a
recipient country is taken as a share or percentage of the total amount of aid allocated by
the donor to be the dependent variable. It is believed that this variable approximates best
the way KFAED undertakes its aid allocation decisions.
C'HAPT TW n C]nNcrEs.crnNar, ToaN~e ar.r.~~Arronr
S,,-auTCHAPTER I WOIA I.(. Al I(.L.C"ICI
The Independent Variables
In accordance with the literature on aid allocation, variables that cover recipient
need (RN) and donor interest (DI) are included. The choice of variables was undertaken
with a view towards maximizing the sample. In other words, the aim was to have
variables that, if at all possible, are available for all countries for which World Bank and
KFAED provides aid data. The justification for this is to avoid selection bias, which
occurs if data are not randomly, but systematically, missing. For example, very poor
countries and countries on the verge of collapse of state order often have poor data
availability.
Recipient needs (RN) and Donor interest (DI) Variables
As previously stated, recipient's per capita income is the most commonly used
variable indicating the economic need, while Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI)
corresponding to the recipient's development needs.
First: For the trade-related variables, we use here the natural log of the value of
exports and imports from Kuwait (data taken from Gleditsch 2001).
Second, in order to check for potential bias towards Arab countries, A dummy
variable is used. An Arab dummy variable was set to 1 for Arab and 0 for non-Arab. This
dummy covers all countries with a majority Arab population.
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An African dummy is set to 1 for all African countries except those which are
Arab.
An Islamic dummy is set to 1 for all countries with majority Muslims, other than
Arab countries. (Table 6 shows Arab, Muslim, and African countries).
Third, to test the importance of DI that are more directly political, we have two variables:
The first one is to reflect a political alliance between a donor and a recipient. Gartzke, Jo
and Tucker (1999) created a measure that estimates of the alliance extracted from the UN
voting records. The second variable is population size. More populous countries is
believed to be more eligible for aid due to their greater importance in comparison to
countries with a smaller population size.
Methodology
Studying the determinants of KFAED aid allocation requires clarifying the
decision process that takes place in deciding on extending a concessional loan to
particular recipient. It is not only do recipients receive different amounts of aid, but some
countries do not receive any aid at all. Furthermore, there are many poor countries that
don't receive aid, while other relatively richer; countries receive a high volume of aid.
Therefore, we will examine whether the factors determining the selection of a country are
the same as those determining the amount of aid for the recipient.
To summarize, our problem is
CONC ERSSONAL LOANS AILOCATION"-IAP)TDR TW"
Y;(1 if Y > 0
0 if Y* otherwise
where Y will take the value of 1, if aid is positive and 0 otherwise. What classes of
models are natural candidates? Let Yk = 1 if country k receives a concessional loan and 0
otherwise. A Logit model is a natural candidate for modeling this dichotomous uncertain
outcome. Conditional on Y,= 1, the amount of aid Y can be modeled in a variety of
ways.
The Logit model posits that the true underlying relationship may be represented as a
conditional probability of group membership (no concessional loan or positive one) in the
forml3:
Logit (Y)= a + ,x + ....... + k Xk
where Y is the dependent variable representing positive aid if equal to 1, and 0 for no aid.
X's are the explanatory variables; that we are testing their effect on the decision to grant
aid or not. It is known that the above Logit equation can be transformed into conditional
probabilities:
Pr(Y = 1/x)= e
1 + e (a +81 x, ...... + pfk xk
where Pr(Y = I/ x)is the probability of granting aid conditional on independent variable
X.
13 Probit can be used as well
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Model specification
To emulate the data situation facing KFAED's management at the time of the decision-
making, All explanatory variables enter the regressions with a one- year lag. Some
studies use a two-year lag instead. The dependent variable was logged to render its
distribution less skewed. As concerns explanatory variables, the population, income and
exports variables were logged in order to allow an elasticity interpretation of their
coefficients. If both the dependent and the explanatory variables are in logged form, then
the respective coefficient can be interpreted as stating by how many percent the
dependent variable is increasing or decreasing given a 1 percent increase in the
explanatory variable.
Data
Aid data were obtained from KFAED from inception, 1962 until 2001. These include
basic information for all projects, grants, countries and loans in their portfolio. Aid refers
here to net official development assistance (ODA). It measures the disbursement of
grants and highly concessional loans (that is, loans with a grant element of at least 25
percent) minus amortization. Since the aid data are in current Kuwaiti Dinar (KD), they
have been transformed into US $ using the prevailing exchange rate KD/$. The
dependent variable is the (natural log) of the amount of KFAED aid that a country
receives as a share of the total amount allocated, which is the total annual aid budget.
Such a dependent variable seeks to represent the actual decision-making process. There is
a fixed aid budget on which is decided what recipient country receives what share of the
CTnhTrFCn~nN a r. Tnd N.C a r.r .nr arrnlu
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total cake, if anything. Per capita GNI, literacy, infant mortality and life expectancy were
taken from World Development Indicators published by the World Bank
The sample
The sample consists of all eligible countries with the exception of the USA, Canada,
Japan, DAC countries, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. As mentioned earlier, the sample
covers the period 1972 -2002. Unfortunately, a number of countries and observation
were lost due to lack of data in the explanatory variables. 14
11.5 Empirical Analysis
The Selection Stage
We ran the Logit to determine the factors that make a recipient country eligible for aid
(selection stage) on XLSTAT software. The model is specified as follows:
Logit Y = a0 + PArab + / 2Musl + 83Africa + 4UN,_, + flTrade,_,
+ / 6LnPLQIt_ + / 7LnPop,_l + 8Ln PerCapita,_-
The summary statistics for the above Logit is in table 6
14 These include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina
Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Maldives, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia,
Mongolia, North Korea, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, Sio Tome e Principe, the Seychelles, Slovakia, the
Solomon Islands, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Vanuatu.
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Table 2 L
2.105 222 < 0.0001
0.947 46 < 0.0001
0.244 2.74 0.098
0.874 31.71 < 0.0001
0 0.63 0.428
-0.047 0.27 0.606
0.105 9.5 0.002
-0.235 16.58 < 0.0001
5027
85
-1328
1%
5%
Table (1) shows that five of the explanatory variables are significant in KFAED choice in
granting aid. A country that is Arab, Muslim, populous, poor and vote with Kuwait is
statically significantly and more likely to be selected to receive aid from KFAED. The
trade variable might be explained incorrectly if we only rely on the existing literature
about the Arab aid. As explained before, unlike western aid, Arab aid is untied aid which
may not let the donor look at commercial/trade interest. However, other Arab donors in
general and Kuwait in particular are exporters of one single commodity, oil, and have
nothing to export or gain any benefit to tie their aid. Furthermore, the industrialized
countries are the main importers from Kuwait and the vast majority of Kuwaiti imports
originate from those same countries. Those countries were excluded from the sample, it is
not unexpected to have insignificant estimates for the trade variable.
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The lack of significance of (PLQI) should not be surprising. More often, donors place
more weight on such visible and easy to understand variables as per capita income and
not on indicator like PLQI.
Table (2) shows the odds for the binary explanatory variable:
For a recipient to be an Arab, the odds are 8.2 to be selected by KFAED to receive aid
compared to non-Arab. For Muslim country, the odds are 2.58 compared to non-Muslim
country.
The above results are in line with the prediction in the literature. Due to Arab
solidarity, Kuwaiti aid allocation is tilted more toward Arab countries than toward others.
The same applies to Muslim and African countries. The number of Arab countries that
received aid from KFAED over the sample period is 17 out of 21, all less developed, and
therefore it is expected that an Arab country be selected in the first stage. The number of
African countries is 40 out of 41, all but 5 of which were Muslim countries (Iran, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE).
The way UN voting variable '" is constructed makes it more difficult to provide a
useful interpretation of its coefficient. However, one can say that a country with voting
1' This is similar to Neumayer (2003d) interpretations.
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identical to Kuwait is estimated to receive a share of aid that is about 68 per cent higher
than a country whose voting similarity value is equal to the sample mean.
The allocation stage
The second stage will determine the factors influencing the amount of aid allocated.
Ordinary least square (OLS) is employed:
Ln %AIDt = a o + f,Arab + /32Musl + /3 Africa + 84UNtI + 65Tradet-
+ / 6LnPLQIe_, + 37LnPop-, + /8 Ln PerCapita,_,
Note that we have the same independent variables in both stages; however, here we are
examining their significance on the amount of aid distributed. The summary statistics are
in table (3)
Table 4 Or arv Least S
1.208
canon
0.089 13.5 < 0.0001
0.267 0.089 3 0.003
-0.088 0.092 -0.9 0.336
-0.007 0.095 -0.08 0.937
0.001 0.001 1.5 0.143
0.031 0.06 0.52 0.604
0.189 0.023 8.17 < 0.0001
0.049 0.044 1.1 0.267
463
5%
1%
0.714
Table (3) shows that neither per capita nor is the similarity of votes statically
significant at this stage as they were in the first stage. Arab, Muslim and populous
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countries not only have higher probabilities of being selected to receive aid, but, as
shown above, they receive a higher share of aid, too.
Table 5 binary variables elasticity-Allocation stage
From table (4), it is estimated that to receive a share aid from KFAED that is about 335
percent higher than to non-Arab country, which clearly underscores the importance of
being Arab. For a Muslim recipient, it is 31 percent. A one percent increase in population
size leads to an aid share that is about 19 percent higher.
From the above two stages, the results do support some of the hypotheses presented in
Section III, chief among them, the existence of an Arab bias in KFAED aid allocation.
Bias toward Muslim countries is also clearly demonstrated in both stages.
It is worth noting that KFAED's lending decision variable is the loan amount,
however, an interesting result was found when we ran the same model, with the log of
aid/capita as the dependent variable. The allocations continue to be of that DI bias as
table 6 shows.
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-0.303 0.111 -2.727 0.007
-0.179 0.113 -1.585 0.114
-0.061 0.115 -0.525 0.599
-0.050 0.120 -0.418 0.676
0.001 0.001 2.202 0.028
-0.051 0.076 -0.665 0.506
0.182 0.029 6.195 < 0.0001
-0.037 0.055 -0.669 0.504
However, despite the fact Arab recipients are allocated higher amount of
concessional loan, it is still receive less aid per capita compared to non-Arab recipients.
Trade variable, as predicted by our hypothesis, turns out both significant and positive.
The above result reinforces our earlier result that KFAED's allocation is tilted toward DI
more than RN.
11.6 Conclusion
The results show the importance of being Arab for receiving aid from KFAED.
Arab countries and more likely to receive aid and if they do receive some amount of aid,
they also receive significantly more aid than non-Arab countries
Therefore, clear evidence for the presence of biasness toward on Arab countries.
However, non-Arab but Muslim Countries are more likely to be both selected by
KFAED' to receive aid than non-Muslim countries, and once selected, they receive more
aid than their counterparts. Furthermore, a country with political alliance with Kuwait is
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more likely to be selected to receive aid. However, this same attribute has no effect on the
amount of aid received.
Poorer countries are more likely to be selected for aid but bear no effect on the amount of
aid.. The trade variable tested insignificant, as expected. Population size matters when it
comes to the allocation stage, and more populous countries are more likely to be eligible
as an aid recipients.
In conclusion, similar to Neumayer (2003d), this paper has shown the important role that
ethnic and religious similarity (being Arab and Islamic) as well as voting similarity in the
UN General Assembly has on the allocation of aid by KFAED. As far as ethnic and
religious similarity is concerned, Arab aid allocation is quite different from aid allocation
by Western donors. For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) do not find evidence that
religion plays a major role in their allocation of aid. Political alliance, as measured by UN
voting, and a country's level of per capita income have an influence on the selection stage
but none on the allocation stage. Some aspects of donor interest (DI) thus clearly have an
important role in KFAED aid allocation at both stages, but recipient need (RN) does so
only at the selection stage.
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Table 7Arab Concessional Aid (net disbursement) 1970-2002
All Arab
Gulf States
UAE
SAUDI
ARABIA
OMAN
QATAR
W1,TI7 A TT
70-74
7,696
6,611
923
4,013
279
1 1QA
75-79
31,870
29,130
4,857
18,515
1,076
A AR)2
80-84
32,741
30,450
2,768
21,503
6
692
4 AR1
85-89
14,831
272
12,253
198
28
9 RI
90-94
13,429
13,190
1957
8,698
189
44
95-99
6,811
6,811
482
4,359
77
187
1 7A
2002
3,398
3,398
219
2,674
24
73
AAR
70-2002
117,513
110,474
11,902
76,975
542
2,602
1 2 AcT
(%)
100
94
10
66
0.5
2.2
source: arabald.org
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Table 8Total Annual Loans (in US $S
33,239,559
16,243,116
49,597,420
4,923,394
27,611,581
31,550,067
12,857,500
19,588,200
27,441,129
16,820,328
44,303,758
58,056,044
137,682,785
316,938,833
298,889,734
355,979,916
185,684,383
322,693,895
246,221,064
601,020,624
714,147,457
221,271,009
176,116,439
254,426,705
243,508,423
239,724,662
272,788,996
399,998,894
370,056,527
432,210,822
626,003,925
246,130,750
600,815,788
453,951,417
525,056,441
458,004,277
474,352,064
337,754,712
570,220,625
652,294,510
286,637,726
146,138,516
352,570,849
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Table 9 Percentage distribution (Sectoral and regional)As of 2003
Transportation
No.
28%
21%
17%
18%
9%
7%
100%
37%
15%
13%
22%
6%
8%
100%
Energy
37%
13%
13%
32%
1%
5%
100%
53%
7%
6%
31%
0%
3%
100%
Industry
52%
2%
10%
34%
0%
2%
100%
54%
2%
6%
37%
0%
1%
100%
Water &
Sewaae
38%
28%
9%
3%
5%
17%
100%
57%
11%
5%
3%
2%
23%
100%
Communication
50%
21%
21%
0%
0%
7%
1 nO/
86%
5%
6%
0%
0%
2%
1 n0o/
Table 10 Sectoral distribution and egions
Water &
Loans Ag iculture Transportation Energy Industry Sewage CommunicationNo. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. AmountArab 252 1769 54 338 76 422 41 406 32 184 24 217 7 90West African 112 337 18 57 55 169 14 55 1 6 18 41 3 5Central,
South & East
African 87 254 10 18 45 143 14 42 6 20 6 20 3 7East, South
Asia & the
Pacific 128 712 20 89 48 248 36 237 21 126 2 11 0 0Latin
American & 31 88 2 13 25 68 1 1 0 0 3 6 0 0Central Asian
& European 43 223 4 9 19 91 6 21 1 5 11 88 1 3
Total 653 3384 108 524 268 1142 112 762 61 341 64 383 14 105
Table 11 G and Avernae Lnan
9,314,802 38.00% 3,539,442
13,986,986 45.68% 6,389,021
14,569,282 46.13% 6,720,154
22,373,565 44.72% 10,005,388
23,174,955 48.47% 11,232,823
100
Loans Agriculture
Arab
West African
Central,
South &
East African
East, South
Asia & the
Pacific
Latin
American
Central
Asian &
European C
Total
39%
17%
13%
20%
5%
7%
100%
52%
10%
8%
21%
3%
7%
100%
50%
17%
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2%
4%
100%
64%
11%
3%
17%
3%
2%
100%
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF GRANT ELEMENT
Abstract
The focus of this study is the "grant element" embedded in the loans of
the Kuwait Fund from 1982 to 2002. It is directed toward two questions:
how large are grant elements and how are they allocated across countries
and sectors? We offer a new rationale in support of using an adjusted
discount rate in calculating grant element--the percentages of subsidy
embedded in the loan. When this rate is applied to estimate the grant
element, our results point to consistent overestimations of the KFAED
published grant element statistics. We then examine the allocation of this
grant element in loans across recipient countries and sectors. We find that
the actual allocation is quite different than that implied by the stated
policy of the KFAED. We also test to see if the allocation is in line with
either of three views regarding how aid should be allocated: gap, macro-
management, governance and institution- building. We find that it is
weakly related to gap, but appears to bear no relation to the other two.
While this does not demonstrate that KFAED only focuses on gap, it does
indicate that to the extent that they focus on macro-management or
governance, their decisions regarding grant element do not bear this out
We tested the difference in KFAED's declared vs. actual grant element
policy. The results show that political factors, income and sectors play a
role in the deviations between the two. Finally, we tested development aid
allocation hypotheses; we found KFAED 's grant allocation only follows
the two-gap hypothesis in its development aid strategy.
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III.1 Introduction
The past forty years witnessed major changes within the domain of International
Financial Institutions (IFIs). Those changes are on two fronts: the changing role and
motivation of aid and the increase in flow of assistance funds to developing countries.
From the role of aid side, the primary role of development aid has shifted from filling the
financing gap to fostering stable macroeconomic polices to enforcing good governance
and institutional building. Each has only succeeded in providing a partial framework
within which to resolve the puzzle of poverty and the key to economic growth. The net
result is that despite decades of economic aid, most of the least developed countries
(LDCs) have shown correspondingly little real growth; in fact, heavy indebtedness to aid
institutions has become a major impediment to growth for many LDCs. Consensus in the
last five years has shifted towards converting loans to grants and thus reducing the debt
overhang that held back growth in these countries. Determining the motive of
development aid is critical as it dictates the donor's priorities and hence significantly
affects the resultant investments and the outcome for the developing world.
From the flow of assistance funds, there was a steady rise in aid flows from developed
countries to developing countries, despite the fact that the growth of aid faltered after
1995 (Lensink and White, 2000 ). As indicated in Table 10 below, the LDCs have
received more foreign aid as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) and aid per
capita than other groups of developing countries. Aid inflows have almost doubled in the
LDCs, in that aid as a percentage of GDP (aid per capita) increased from 7.6 percent
C]H APTF R  ,F. fi:MPIR IrA I ,  l .YCI~ P CR A T EIEM E:NT
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(US$15.2) in the 1976-80 period to 11.6 percent (US$29) in the 1991-95 period. Among
the group of other low-income countries, aid as a percentage of GNI (aid per capita)
increased from 2.9 percent (US$7.3) in the 1976-80 periods to 4.4 percent (US$13.5) in
the 1991-95 period. As for the rest of the group, aid as a percentage of GNI and aid per
capita in the 1996-2000 period has not changed much from the 1970-75 period, but the
trend for aid flow as a percentage of GDP has declined since the 1991-1995 period.
Aid (% of GNI)
LDCs 7.6 7.5 9.5 11.6 7.7
Low income 2.9 2.9 3.6 4.4 2.7
Lower middle income 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6
Upper middle income 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2
Aid per capita (current US$)
LDCs 15.2 19.1 26.8 28.9 21.5
Low income 7.3 8.5 11.7 13.5 10
Lower middle income 4.4 4.7 6.1 8.9 7.6
Upper middle income 4.1 6 8 16.4 10.5
By 1995, the flow of foreign aid to developing countries reached its peak of
nearly US$520 billion. The cumulated amount of actual foreign aid flow by 1996 was
more than US$12 trillion (OECD, 1997). This figure just exceeds the amount of foreign
aid that is required to achieve a growth rate of about 4 to 5 percent per year in developing
countries. However, developing countries have not experienced this rate of growth since
the 1980s.
In 1960-79, the median per capita growth in developing countries was 2.5 percent. In
1980-98, the median per capita growth of developing countries was 0.0 percent, [and]
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virtually no countries outside Asia registered per capita growth at or above the 1960-79
average of 2.5 percent.
While the 1980s were dubbed the "lost decade" for developing countries in general and
LDCs in particular, the 1990s have become, for LDCs, the decade of increasing
marginalization, inequality, poverty and social exclusion. The number of LDCs almost
doubled from the first list compiled in the early 1970s to 49 countries in 2001. Only
Botswana has "graduated" from the LDC group. During the 1980s, several African
countries experienced negative economic growth despite a substantial increase of aid
inflow to these countries (White, 1992a). "A large number of countries became more aid-
dependent in the 1990s than they were in the late 1970s" (Tsikata, 1998, p.7).
In the mid-1990s, as a result of the above accumulated debt by many of the developing
countries, there was a call to lessen the burden of this debt through many programs.
Among these are HIPC, heavily indebt poor countries initiative, and HIPC II. In 2000, a
renewed interest in lifting the burden of debt surfaced in the development community.
The new call was, this time, directed toward increasing the concessionality, or grant
element, in development aid. The chief architect of this new policy was the Meltzer
Commission that was formed by the US Congress to review the state of US aid.
III.2 The research
While much of the aid literature has dealt extensively with assessing its
effectiveness and role(s) in growth and development, another strand of the aid literature
has focused mainly on studying donors' aid allocations and the motivations and interests
influencing the policy. At the beginning of this decade, as a result of the failure of many
1 ()
CHAPTE R THREE: EMPI R1C1A I . A NA I.YSIS ~R C:R ANT EI.EM ENT
CHATI- THEF F----YY i/-PIRI AL ANARIV- s OF GRANT ELFMVNT
development policies of the past, a new debate surfaced in the aid cormnunity, calling for
an increase in the concessionality in the already-concessional loans extended to the
developing countries.
This research is an attempt to link the above two strands of literature by
investigating whether actual aid allocation policy is influenced by these aid effectiveness
criteria and roles. Through this linking, the research will have a profound understanding
of the impact of aid and will add more clarity about the effectiveness of donors'
allocation policy.
Unlike many of the prior studies that researched aid allocation, this research will use only
the concessionality level--grant element--as opposed to total loan amount as the
parameter of aid. However, before investigating such allocation, a closer look at the way
grant element is being measured is required. By doing so, we will clarify the confusion
surrounding the calculations of grant element that have not been addressed in the
published aid statistics.
Furthermore, the lack of literature covering Arab aid creates a genuine need for applying
this research to Arab aid allocation. Therefore, the research focuses on investigating the
allocation and the factors that determine grant allocation policy. Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development (KFAED) will be used as a case in our analysis. Examining the
volume of aid during the last few decades shows its importance as the largest and oldest
Arab bilateral development institution. The above importance stems from the fact that
Arab aid had reached close to $120 billion in 2004, representing almost 1.3 percent of
their GNP and 13 percent of total world aid. Some researchers had attributed this gap in
the literature to the lack of accurate published data on the part of Arab developmental
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institutions. But in recent years, Arab donors started publishing their data and statistics,
making feasible the potential of filling the gap.
Research Questions
The research seeks to clarify two aspect of grant element: estimation and allocation, each
with its own questions:
1 Grant element:
o What is grant element and how it is calculated?
o What discount rate is used in grant element calculation? What discount
rate should be used?
o Does the grant element change significantly with the selected discount
rate? And if so, what are the implications for KFAED's allocation policy?
2 Allocation policy
o What is KFAED's declared grant element allocation policy vs. the real
policy?
o Does KFAED grant allocation take into consideration the roles of aid
development, namely the financial gap, macroeconomic management and
institutional strengthening and good governance as suggested by the
literature?
Research Methodology
This paper uses Kuwait Fund for Arabic Economic Development as a case study and
source of data. As mentioned in the first chapter, KFAED is the oldest and largest
bilateral aid institution in the third world. We re-estimate KFAED's grant element based
on a new and adjusted discount rate. The significance of the difference between the
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published and the re-estimated grant element is tested. A fixed effect General Linear
Model, with repeated measurement, is employed to test the difference in KFAED's
declared vs. actual policy in grant element allocation. Additionally, the present allocation
is tested against KFAED's policy regarding the roles and strategy of aid as presented in
the literature review.
The research is structured in two parts. The first part presents the analytics of
grant element and offers a re-estimation of the KFAED grant element. The second part
empirically investigates how the KFAED currently makes its grant element allocation
decision, by modeling grant element based on KFAED's declared policy and then testing
the real policy on alternative roles of aid development, under both economic and
institutional factors, as suggested by the literature.
The next section reviews the literature pertaining to the three gaps facing LDCs that are
related to the role of aid in development. Section 3 summarizes the analytics of grant
element and advances our argument for using donor's cost of funds as a proxy for
discount rate. Section 4 presents the model, tests the hypotheses, and reports the result
and conclusion.
III.3 Literature Review
In this section we examine the shifting role of development aid and the theories that
fueled each of these strategic directions. We start with the three roles and strategies of aid
as suggested by the literature. We end the section with the result of these strategies: the
debt problem and the Meltzer recommendations.
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The Role of Aid
As we discussed in detail in the first chapter, aid has taken on many roles in
development over the past four decades. It started by assuming the role to fill the
financial resource gaps, a view that was dominant in 1960s and 70s. These gaps happened
on two fronts, both in the savings rate and hence capital generation and also in the foreign
exchange. As this strategy failed to produce the desired results, a new role was then
incorporated into the development aid strategy in the World Bank lending policy. Starting
in 1980s, fiscal and macro-policy conditionality was incorporated in the development aid
strategy. The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) became the main focus of the World
Bank. The underlying idea was that the developing countries needed fiscal restraint to
create an attractive environment for investment. The resultant policies included drive
towards privatization, reduction in government intervention in the economy, etc. The
outcome of most of these programs was lackluster and actually led to negative outcomes
and created a high debt problem in some developing countries. Towards the mid-1990s,
another role for aid allocation was put forth. Governance and institutional strengthening
became the central theme and main objective of World Bank lending policy. The
following sections discuss these different roles in detail.
The Two Gaps
One of the most frequently used models in traditional development finance theory
is the so-called "two-gap" growth model formulated by Hollis Chenery, Alan Strout and
Ronald McKinnon in the mid-1960s (Chenery and Strout 1965). This model holds that
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there is a need for development assistance because developing countries need to
overcome structural and other weaknesses in order to close the gap with developed
countries. Specifically, the recipient countries need to fill two financial gaps: the "savings
gap" and the "foreign exchange gap." Based on this theory, the purpose of development
assistance is to supplement low domestic savings and foreign exchange earnings.
The two-gap model starts with the argument that in order to achieve equilibrium
income in a model of economic growth, the level of planned savings has to be equal to or
more than projected investment requirements. In poor countries, the domestic savings
rate is usually lower than the level that is required for investment to meet the output
growth target, creating a savings gap. Therefore, foreign investments, especially
development finance on concessional terms including grants, are useful to help these
countries fund the necessary investment (Chenery and Stout 1966). According to the two-
gap model, the role of development finance is to fill these capital "gaps," and the savings
gap is the first one that development assistance has to fill.
Even if the domestic savings rate is high enough, the economic growth of a developing
country may still be constrained if there are not enough foreign exchange reserves or
export earnings to finance the necessary imports. Developing countries, most of which do
not themselves have hard currencies, may be in need of financial resources that enable
them to fund the imports. Therefore, in addition to the investment-savings gap, there is a
level of imports that needs to be funded in order to achieve the equilibrium level of
income in an open economy. These imports could include both producers' durable goods,
such as machinery and equipment for production, and consumer goods. This constraint
would be removed if developing countries could receive hard currencies to pay for these
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imports of both capital and consumer goods, and therefore fill the "foreign exchange," or
"import-export" gap (McKinnon 1964). This is the second gap development finance has
to fill according to this model.
Under the two-gap theory, development assistance is provided to a developing
country in order to remove both the domestic savings gap and the foreign exchange gap,
so that the recipient countries can achieve optimal economic growth. Assistance gives
them the external funds to achieve rapid economic success by buying more and better
imported equipment and financing bigger, better and more investment projects. So under
the role of aid as filling the gap, it is assumed that higher levels of assistance would be
directly associated with faster economic development and improvement of living
standards. However, by focusing on the volume of development assistance, the two-gap
model generally ignored the policy environment and other factors that are related to the
efficient use of resources. In such a theoretical framework, the country policy
environments do not play a significant role in determining the effectiveness of
development aid.
Macroeconomic Management
The magnitude of the debt crisis and the imbalances, both internally and
externally, faced by most developing countries, means an adjustment is a necessary for a
resumption of development. The debt service obligation (the total debt was estimated at
$1 trillion towards the end of the 1980s) became large enough to reverse the net flow
(from developing to the developed countries) reaching $15 billion annually during 1987-
1989 (Brown 1990:132).
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In response, the development strategy of the 1960s and 70s had to be adjusted. The main
policy objective of many multilateral aid institutions became macroeconomic stability,
and consisted of a set of policies to reduce developing countries' two main deficits:
balance-of-payments and budget. The World Bank lending policy shifted to the so-called
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). A typical adjustment package consisted of
measures such as devaluation, removal of artificial price distortions, trade liberalization
and institutional changes at the sector level. (Thorbecke 2002)
The rise in the oil prices in the late 1970s and the past decades of accumulated
debt changed the role of aid in a fundamental way. The aid purpose became twofold: 1)
stop-gap measures to keep the international financial system afloat and 2) imposed
conditionalities to promote the implementation of the adjustment policies.
This view gained dominance in the 1980s in the development literature. It became
widely accepted that macroeconomic factors, especially whether a developing country
had a stable macroeconomic framework and conducive economic environment for
development, play an important role in the economic growth of a country. Corden (1991)
documented, for both Mexico and Chile, respectable growth associated their
macroeconomic reform. Among the reforms were lowering the inflation and reducing the
budget deficit. On the other hand, the growth crisis Brazil faced in the late 1980s and
early 90s was attributed to macroeconomic instability. In supporting this view, Fisher
(1993) summarized the factors should be looked at to appraise a macroeconomic
management framework. A favorable macroeconomic framework can be represented by
low inflation, appropriate real interest rates, stable and sustainable fiscal policy,
competitive and predictable exchange rates, and a viable balance of payments situation.
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According to Fisher, the best single indicator of whether macroeconomic policies
facilitate growth is the inflation rate. Because there are few arguments in favor of high
inflation, the overall ability of the government to manage a country's economy can be
reflected through whether the inflation is high. Fisher's study indicated that low inflation,
small budget deficits, and relatively efficient foreign exchange markets are conducive to
growth.
Bringing development assistance into the equation, in studying aid, policy and
growth in Africa, Hadjimichale (1995) concluded that soundness of the economic policy
is a major factor in increasing the impact of development assistance on economic growth.
The same result was reached by Burnside and Dollar (1997) and Tsikata (1998). On the
other hand, Guillamont and Chauvet (1999) reached even stronger result when they
found, independent of aid, that growth is positively influenced by conducive
macroeconomic policy.
Few papers have addressed the question of what kind of aid produces growth. Sawada,
Kohama, and Kono (2004) find that grant on average has no effect on growth, but loans
to a country with good policies are associated with faster growth. Similar results were
reached by Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2004).
Institutional Building and Governance Gap
Until the mid-1990s, the structural adjustment program was the dominant role for
aid. However, the overall situation of LDCs was stagnant largely due to poor governance
in Sub-Saharan Africa and most transitional economies in Eastern Europe (Thorbecke,
114
CH A PTFR TH RFE:" F~MPIRl~dl bNdl VCIC nB C~-R hNT F~ FMFNT
-APTJ TH4 VMPI. [CAL- ANAL--YSIS OF GRAN- EIF- F --
2000). A World Bank (1998) report 16 attracted a lot of attention with its blunt
proposition that aid is only beneficial when there are sound economic policies and good
governance, and is typically ineffective in countries with highly distorted economic
policies and bad governance. However, the report and other research (Burnside and
Dollar (1997), Collier and Dollar (2001a) and World Bank (1998)) supporting it came
under criticism on methodological ground (e.g. Lensink and White (2000), Hansen and
Tarp (2000, 2001), and Dalgard and Hansen (2001). However, elements of governance,
such as corruption, have been extensively studied. Using Business International (BI)
corruption indices (now part of the Economist Intelligence Unit), Mauro (1995) showed
evidence that corruption is negatively correlated with the level of investment and
economic growth, and that countries with negative political risk factors tend to have
slower growth. Keefer and Knack (1994) supported Mauro's conclusions by using ICRG
(International Country Risk Group) as a proxy for political risk.
According to Wenli Lu (2002), an improvement in BI corruption indices may increase
investments by 5 percent of GDP and 0.5 percent increase in per capita GDP.
From the donor's side, there was a new agenda toward placing more weight on
good governance by western donors. As noted by Selbervik (1997: 7), there has been a
"wave of policy announcements by Western donors in the 1990s postulating that good
governance will occupy a central place on the aid agenda." There seems to be a general
agreement on what constitutes the most fundamental aspects of good governance:
political freedom and democracy, human rights, the rule of law, the quality of public
sector management, the control of corruption and the reduction of "excessive" military
16 Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why.
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expenditures (OECD-DAC 1994). . The World Bank report (1998) documents the effect
of Good Governance and good institutions on the success and failure at the project level.
For example, there were 68 percent success rates for rural water supply project with high
beneficiary participation compared with low participation.
Debt Relief Benefits
As was mentioned earlier, many of these countries became heavily indebted and
repayment had become a constraint on economic development. Thus, several developing
countries--particularly in Latin America--faced severe debt crises and, in the mid-1990s,
both the IMF and the World Bank started the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative to bring down the debt of low-income countries to sustainable levels. According
to many economists, such large accumulation of debt has led to the creation of the so-
called "debt overhang" for the majority of borrowing countries. According to Claessens
(Claessens et al., 1996), debt overhang occurs when debt service exceeds a country's
repayment ability and expected debt service is likely to be an increasing function of the
country's level of output. Sachs (1990) demonstrated that external debt overhang plays an
important role in heavily indebted countries. They asserted that debt overhang is the main
reason for slowing economic growth in indebted countries. In such circumstances,
Greene and Khan (1990) argued that income return from public investment outflows from
the domestic economy to the existing foreign creditors, creating little incentive for local
government to foster further growth. Not only will new investment by domestic and
foreign creditors be discouraged, but a disincentive effect of investment, in general, will
be created. The debtor country will only share partially in any increase in output and
exports, as a higher proportion of the increase will be used to service the debt.
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The theoretical basis underpinning the increase in grants or conversion of loans to
grants is related to the benefits of debt relief for both the donor and recipient. Krugman
(1991) argued that reduction of debt can be beneficial for both debtors and creditors. He
demonstrated that whether the benefit will accrue depends on the level of the
indebtedness and the timing of relief. This is best illustrated using the Laffer curve
(shown in Figure 3 above). When a country has a low level of debt (Point A), less income
will be required for debt service and loans will be directed to fund productive projects
that will help the country in repaying the existing debt stock. As debt increases (moving
from point B to C) and marginal benefits of capital decrease, the benefits of growth will
go to the creditors, leaving little incentive for growth. In this case, the debtor is said to be
on the "wrong side" of the debt Laffer curve. Beyond point B, the curve implies that there
is a limit at which debt accumulation stimulates growth and that there is a threshold at
which more aid is detrimental to growth (Lensink and White 2000). If countries are
unlikely to repay loans, Krugman's debt Laffer curve hypothesis suggests that grants will
be more useful in maintaining incentives for growth and development in the recipient
nation.
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As shown in this section, through debt relief, it is hoped that HIPCs will graduate from
their poor stage and start their economies growing. It is the objective of this debt relief to
reduce the transfer of benefits of the expected growth to the donors and help increase the
incentive to the borrowers by letting more benefit be accrued. Or, as Krugman argued,
lowering the interest rate on new lending (higher grant element) can increase the
incentive for a heavily indebted country to "adjust its policy" toward more productive
investment.
In early 2000, to reduce the debt burden on LDCs' economies, a new debate
centered on increasing the concessionality in the already concessional loans extended to
the developing countries. This debate arose after the US administration proposed that the
aid community convert 50 percent of its loans into grants. This argument is based on the
fact that current concessional loans already have a large grant component and thus
switching to grants allows resource transfer without the debt build-up that is currently
handicapping many recipient countries and eventually will reduce the debt overhang
effect. Furthermore, they argued that increasing the grant component would provide the
aid institutions greater leverage in how funds are allocated. 17 Alan Meltzer, the
commission's chairman, argued: "Grants can provide the same amount of aid, make
every dollar more effective, provide a permanent exit from debt for the poorest countries,
protect donor contributions from risk loss--all without diminishing the funding pool or
asking for more money from the taxpayers of the industrialized nations" (Lerrick 2001).
17 There are many types of grants: outright grants as lump sum or as annual, technical or grants embedded
in a loan. Our research deals with the latter type.
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The majority of development aid institutions are less supportive to the proposal. They
argued that by increasing the grants, the supply of funds would diminish over time,
therefore reducing future development lending activities.
111.4 Grant element Analytics
External assistance is comprised of aid or concessional finance, also known as
"official development assistance" (ODA), and market-related or non-concessional
finance. For many LDCs, aid-flows account for the majority of external assistance for
development purposes. However, many developing countries also use export credits and
other types of non-concessional funding.
Development aid is comprised of grants, which are transfers that do not have to be repaid,
and loans, which qualify as ODA to developing countries. Three conditions must be
present in any loan in order to be classified as ODA or concessional loan:
* The loan is made by the official public sector - that is by any government or a
government's institution;
* Its objective is to promote economic development and welfare; and
* It has a grant element of at least 25%.
Loans, which are lent by the public sector (institution or state) but do not qualify as ODA
because they are not primarily aimed at development or are not concessional, are known
as other official flows (OOF). These include export credits extended by donor
governments or guaranteed by them. Military grants and loans are also classified as OOF.
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In this section, we start by stating the confusions surrounding the concessionality,
followed its measurement. Then, we present the necessary conditions for loan
concessionality and advance our argument in favor of using donor's cost of funds as the
appropriate discounting future cash flow repayment in determining the grant element. We
conclude by re-estimating KFAED's concessionality using our new discount rate.
Concessionality
The confusion surrounding the grant element is twofold. The first is caused by the
OECD Development Assistance Committee's commonly accepted practice of assuming
only one discount rate: 10 percent. Operationally, the confusion is exacerbated by a
failure to adjust the discount rate over time in line with changing market interest rate
conditions to reflect more accurately the cost of capital (Leipziger 1983. p330). The
second confusion is related to whom the discount rate, used to discount the loan
repayment, should refer to? In other words, should the grant element reflect a donor's
costs or a recipient's benefits?
Surprisingly, given the widely published aid statistics, grant element calculation has not
attracted more detailed analysis. Moreover, the use of the 10 percent discount rate and the
assumptions underlying its use has not been challenged in the literature.
Among the existing research that has been published, some have made confusing claims
regarding the 10 percent discount rate used to discount the future repayment of the loan
in measuring its concessionality: the grant element. It is not that this 10 percent is
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arbitrary only, but, more importantly; it became apparent that some researchers 18 () have
assumed this 10 percent to be the recipient's alternative cost of financing. We offer a
rationale for using the donor's cost of funds as the discount rate to calculate the grant
element, and not the recipient's alternative cost of financing.' 9
GE Measurement
The grant element is measured as the difference between the loan's face value and
the present value of the future cash inflow (both the principle and interest) discounted at
an appropriate discount rate divided by the loan face value.
(Loan amount - Pr esent value) x 100GE(%) = (Loan amount)
The above reflects the loan terms at the time of commitment, when the loan is agreed
upon. The present value is the discounted stream of future debt service payments
assuming the loan is fully disbursed on the date of contract. In other words, the
calculation of future interest payments is on the total loan amount and does not take into
account that disbursements can take place over a number of years.
A simple formula for the calculation of the grant element is:
L- n R,
+' (1+d)'GE(%) = (1)L
where:
18 as in Mejren 2002
19 It worth noting that the majority refer to the 10 percent as donor's cost of funds. However, no rationale is
given (see Chang 1998).
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GE: grant element
L : Face value of the loan at t=O.
R,: Debt service payment (principal plus interest) in year t
d: The discount rate
n : The last year in which payments are due
To get an insight into the dynamics of variables determining the grant element, we need
to re-examine the underlying theory of grant element using the following function:
GE = f(G,M,r,d) (2)
Grant element (GE) is a function of grace period (G), maturity (M), loan interest rate (r)
and discount rate (d).
Differentiating (2) with respect to each variable:
8GE dGE aGE aGE
=f,>0 =f>0 -f<0 =f>0
aG M ar , 3 d (3)
From (3), the grant element will increase ceteris paribus, with longer grace period, longer
loan maturity, lower loan interest rate and higher discount rate used in discounting loan
repayment.
As stated earlier, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD
defines concessional loans as having a grant element--calculated on the basis of a
uniform 10 percent discount rate for all loans--of at least 25 percent. This is the current
basis used for defining ODA. The difficulty with this definition is that at times of low
interest rates, as will be shown later in this section, it is possible for a classified
concessional loan from a development institution to be non-concessional or even
profitable.
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Loan Concessionality: Necessary Conditions
For the existence of a positive grant element, the interest on the loan IL must not
only be lower than the discount rate used to discount the future cash flow repayment, but
must be low enough to produce the 25 percent grant element, one of the conditions for
classifying a loan as ODA. So the question posed here is: to what shall the discount rate
used refer?
In order to answer the question, we need to explain the relationship among the three
costs: loan interest IL, donor's cost of funds ID, and the recipient cost of funds I R .
First, donor's cost of funds, ID is always lower than recipient's cost of funds, I R . This is
based on economic grounds: a donor country possesses certain economic and financial
characteristics that are not found in recipient countries. A common one is that donors are
all classified as rich nations by the World Bank, with higher per capita income compared
to recipient countries. It can be argued that this higher per capita income acts to reduce
the risk of default and thus lowers the cost of funds facing these "rich nations" compared
to poorer nations. Furthermore, this higher per capita income is a result of a well-
developed economy and financial system, as is the case with western donors and Japan,
or is a result of excess liquidity20. It is not surprising that all donor countries have higher
sovereign debt ranking than all recipient countries 21
In notation,
20 As is the case in oil producing countries like Kuwait Saudi Arabia and UAE.
21 According to Moody Investor Services' Global Credit Research ranking 2003.
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I R >- ID (4)
Secondly, we argue that loan cost 22 IL must be lower than the recipient's cost of funds
IR (alternative cost of financing) for the loan to be concessional.
In notation,
IR -IL (5)
From (4) and (5), we have;
I R > ID IL (6)
Both the donor's costs and loan costs are less than that of the recipient, for the loan to be
concessional. The question is then what is the relation between the loan cost and donor's
costs?
In case the donors lend below their cost of funds, then with time it is expected that their
budget will dry up and less funds will be available for re-lending. 23 Therefore, donors,
like KFAED, will lend above their cost of funds.
In notation,
I R >- I L  I (7)
In both the development finance literature and the aid publications, it has been
assumed that the discount rate used to calculate the present value of the future repayment
is equal to 10 percent. While few argue that this discount must reflect the recipient's
alternative financing (e.g., Al-Mejren 2005), the majority assume it correspond to the
donor's opportunity cost (e.g., Chang 1998).
22 We use loan cost and interest interchangeably. For simplicity, we assume no grace period throughout the
paper.
23 This is the same argument that many of the IFIs used to oppose Meltzer's recommendations in increasing
the grant elements.
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While the use of 10 percent might be correct if the term of the concessional loan is
comparable to that of the commercial loan which the grant element equation is assuming,
in reality, the concessional loan term, like the one extended by KFAED, is a sovereign
debt. A sovereign debt entails seniority above all other claims and debts, rendering it
facing lower default risk than commercial loans. Therefore, the assumption that the donor
can lend the loan at 10 percent in the market is exaggerated. Therefore, there is a need to
adjust the discount rate used in calculating the grant element to reflect the decrease in
default risk that was created because of the "sovereignty" attached to the concessional
loan.
In case of Kuwait, according to Moody Investors Service, its government bonds
rating averaged A2 24 ratings. To calculate the spread above KFAED's rating to reflect
the "risk" of its recipients that must be added to reflect the newly adjusted discount rate,
which at the same time reflects the actual alternative cost of financing available for the
recipient, we obtained the average of equally weighted sovereign debt ratings for
KFEAD's recipient, which is the midpoint between Baa3 and Bal. From Figure 4 below,
there is an average spread of 100 basis points between Kuwait ratings and the average
rating for KFAED's recipients. We add this spread to KFAED's cost of funds to arrive at
our adjusted discount rate.
24 The rating ranges between Al and A2.
125
CHAPTER THREE: . EMPIRICAIL ANAINYSIS OF GRANT EEMENT
(7HAPTV11 TREI- E: EIC A
Figure 4 Ratings and Credit Spread
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GE Re-estimation: The Case of the KFAED
In this section, we review the characteristics that KFAED's concessional loans
possess. Then we proceed to re-estimate the grant element embedded in KFAED's
concessional loans using the newly adjusted discount rate.
KFAED's Loans Terms
Unlike many concessional development loans, KFAED loans are set in Kuwaiti
Dinar 25 (KD) equivalent and not in US dollars as in the case of many bilateral institutions
and the World Bank or some universal monetary units (i.e., SDR or Arab Dinar). The
interest charged on all the loans is fixed during the duration of the loan. Given that the
interest rate on the loans is already low, it is a position KFAED took to fix such a rate so
25 Thus no foreign exchange risk facing KFAED.
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as not to create an added future burden on the recipient in case of rising interest rates.
Furthermore, KFAED has been traditionally extending its loans with semi-annual
repayments.
Grant Element Re-estimation
The Kuwait Fund's loan portfolio consists of more than 700 loans extended to
more than 100 countries. As the largest government agency, in term of capital, it is not
unrealistic to assume that the cost of fund facing KFAED is KIBOR26 (Kuwaiti Inter-
Bank Offer Rate). KIBOR was instated by Kuwait Central Bank in 1983. It is important
to mention that the KD was pegged to a basket of major currencies 27 up until 2003. In
2003, the central bank of Kuwait dropped the basket and pegged the KD to a single
currency: the US dollar.
We obtained the KIBOR from the Central Bank of Kuwait. The KIBOR data (shown in
Table 12 below) covers the period from 1983, reducing our grant element data to start
from 1983 instead of the fund's first loan in 1961.
26 Since there is no Bond Market in Kuwait, we used KIBOR as the proxy for KFAED's cost of funds.27 US Dollar, Japan Yen, German Mark, French Franc and UK Pound.
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Table 13: Annual One Year KIBOR
7.4061
6.3324
7.707
7.119
7.225
7.5563
6.6962
7.134
4.8392
3.3218
2.7949
Using the data in the above table, we construct the KIBOR's yield overtime for from
1983 until 2003 as in Figure 5 below
Figure 5 KIBOR Yield (1983-2003)
However, since the majority of KFAED loans are of longer maturities with an average of
22 years, it was necessary to determine a hypothetical KIBOR yield equivalent to match
the maturity
28 In 1991 Kuwait was occupied by Iraq. For the purpose of our calculations, we will assume the 1991 rate
to be equal to the 1990 (pre-occupation) rate.
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Given that the tying of the KD Dinar with the US dollar was instated in 2003, one way,
and a reasonable one to extend the yield curve on KIBOR, is to use US T-Bill spreads as
a proxy for the spread between the short term KIBOR rate and the long-maturity rate.
We obtained the US Treasury-T-bill yield spread in 2005 as shown in Figure 6 below.
Figure 6 US T-Bill Yield 2005
Therefore, we added the spread between the US T-bill and US treasury of the appropriate
maturity over the existing KIBOR yield to arrive at a yield to maturity for each loan in
KFAED loan portfolio.
Substituting the annual KIBOR plus 1 percent (to reflect the added risk of 100 basis
points) into the following equation instead of the 10 percent discount uniformly used by
KFAED in all of its loans results in overall significantly reduced estimates for the grant
elements in KFAED's loan portfolio.
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where:
GE: grant element
G: grace period
r: contractual annual interest rate
M: loan maturity, including grace period
d: our new compounded discount rate for semiannual payment (I+ d) 1
We re-estimated the new grant element using the adjusted discount rate. The
findings are surprising and mixed. We ran Wilcoxon 29 signed-ranks test/two-tailed test
for both samples of grant element (the original and the re-estimated). At 1 percent
significance, the decision is to reject the null hypothesis that the samples are not different
(Table 13). In other words, the difference between the two samples is significant.
Table 14: Wilcoxon Two-tailed Statistics (two paired sample)
436.000
44205.000
6196066.500
-17.584
2.576
< 0.0001
0.01
29 In addition, we ran a parametric test (z and t test for paired sample) and reached a similar conclusion by
rejecting the same hypothesis.
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From Table 14, and shown in Figure 7, there is a strict overestimation of KFAED's grant
element in all years, with an average of 10 percent difference. The total overestimation
accounted for close to $1600 million since 1983, in 2003 dollars.
Table 15: GE Overestimation
41.79% 31.26% 10.54%
44.52% 32.29% 12.22%
40.21% 32.89% 7.31%
48.77% 41.00% 7.77%
42.28% 34.61% 7.67%
44.80% 37.05% 7.75%
46.78% 38.04% 8.74%
47.18% 38.11% 9.07%
47.47% 38.10% 9.37%
41.96% 32.24% 9.72%
44.33% 34.59% 9.74%
42.89% 33.17% 9.72%
45.24% 34.49% 10.75%
44.96% 34.02% 10.93%
48.54% 36.94% 11.60%
45.48% 33.82% 11.66%
47.44% 35.32% 12.12%
46.99% 34.52% 12.47%
49.90% 37.02% 12.88%
49.35% 35.99% 13.36%
43.38% 30.32% 13.06%
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Figure 7: GE: Differences between GE-Re-estimated GE
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11I.5 Grant Element Allocation: Empirical Testing
The purpose of this section is twofold: the first is statistically testing KFAED's
stated vs. actual policy in its grant element allocations; the second is testing whether
actual aid allocation policy is influenced by aid effectiveness criteria and roles as was
suggested in the literature review section.
KFAED's Grant Element Policy: Stated vs. Actual KFAED Policy
Kuwait Fund established its grant element allocation based on two criteria: the
recipient income and the sector being financed. It groups the recipients into three income
classes while categorizing the sectors into four groups. Each set is assigned an average
grant element, based on a range on which KFAED decided.
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Data from 1983 to 2002 were obtained from KFAED. These include basic infonrmation
for all projects, grants, countries and loans in its portfolio.
Grant Element: This variable is the percentage of grant component in all loans extended
by KFAED since 1983.The grant element is the ratio of a loan's grant amount to the total
value of the loan. The grant amount is equal to the loan's face value minus the present
value of future repayments. These data were compiled from KFAED's database.
Sectors: KFAED classifies the sectors it finances into eight sectors: agriculture,
transportation, energy, industry, water, sewage, communication and social (education and
health). However, for its stated policy in grant element allocation, the classifications are
reduced to four categories: social, agriculture, industry and the rest, which represents all
other sectors.
GNI Per Capita: The single most common and most relevant indicator variable included
in studies of aid allocation is a country's level of income. It represents the annual income
of the average citizen. The lower this income is, the poorer on average a country is and
therefore the more in need of aid. In its guidelines on developmental aid, KFAED states
clearly that aid should be concentrated on the poorest countries. Data were taken from
World Development Indicators. The per capita is taken as current and not constant prices
to reflect KFAED's decision at the time of allocation.
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KFAED's Stated Policy
According to KFAED's grant element allocation guidelines, Table 15 breaks
down the sectors and recipients' income groups and their designated average grant
element in percent. 30
Table 16: KFAED's GE (%) Allocation Guidelines
Making a closer investigation of KFAED's concessional loan portfolio since 1984, we
notice some deviations from its actual allocations compared to its stated grant element
allocation policy, as shown below in Table 16. Some of those deviations were to the
benefit of the recipients, while others were not.
Reconstructing the above table using KFAED actual grant allocation policy results in the
following table.3'
30 The variations in the range in the above grant element table within each subset is due to other factors
such as the project economic rate of return, relation to Kuwait, new government in the recipient country.31 KFAED had only recently started funding the health and education sector; therefore they are excluded.
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The actual policy is noticeably different from the declared one. There is an "over-
granting" for the higher income bracket within the recipients in both the agriculture and
the rest of the sectors and an "under-granting" for the lower income bracket within the
recipients in all sectors. For the middle-income group, the variations are mixed. These
deviations become clearer when we investigate a sample of recipient countries that had
been allocated grant element very differently than the stated average in KFAED's policy.
Deviations of Policy: Examples
We take the lowest income bracket for a country like Mozambique (Table 17) that
had two agricultural projects that were financed by KFAED.
Table 18: Mozambique Agricultural Sector GE Allocation
Per Capita income Year GE
$150 1997 38.01%
$310 1987 60.10%
Mozambique's per capita income more than halved in one decade, from $310 in 1987 to
$150 in 1997, yet the grant element decreased from 60 percent to 38 percent. This is
contrary to KFAED's stated policy in its grant element allocations.
As illustrated in Table 18, Egypt, a country that had "graduated" from a lower class of
income, received higher grant element for financing a project in the same sector as
agriculture, industry and the rest. The average grant elements in all sectors had increased
at the same time its income increased.
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Table 19: Egypt GE-Income-Sector Comparison
Transport, telecommunication, power and water
supply
Income bracket Year Average GE
Low income group 1978 38%
Middle income group 2002 53%
Agriculture sector
Income bracket Year Average GE
Low income group 1987 41%
Middle income group 1990 55%
Industry sector
Income bracket Year Average GE
Low income group 1977 36%
Middle income group 1989 42%
The above examples do suggest the presence of anomalies in KFAED's actual policy
grant element allocation, which necessitates a more thorough statistical analysis.
Modeling Policies Differences: General Linear Model (GLM)
In this section, we resort to testing both KFAED's declared policy and actual
policy by using more sophisticated statistical techniques. Since our objective is
comparing two policies with categorical factors--sector and income group--an appropriate
method is running GLM of the variables specified in KFAED's declared policy as having
the only weight in the grant element allocation decision policy: sector financed and
recipient income. Since we are dealing with more than one dependent variable--declared
and actual grant element allocation, and categorical independent variables--the choice of
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the GLM is best suited in our case. Table 19 shows the within subjects and between
subjects for our GLM model, repeated measure.
Table 20: Within-Subjects and Between-Subjects Factors
Within-Subjects Factors
Policy Dependent Variable
1 GE-Actual
2 GE-Declared
Between-Subjects Factors
Factors Group Cases (N)
1 Low 183
Income 2 Mid 122
3 High 55
1 Agriculture 51
Sector 2 Industry 26
3 Rest 283
Running both policies as dependent variables (within subjects factors) and both sectors
and income as between subjects factors, we gained the immediate result that there are
significant variations between the policies.
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Table 21: Multivariate Results (Income-Sector - main effect)
Multivariate Results - Income - Sector b
Partial Eta
Effect Value F-Stat Siginifcance Squared
policy Pillai's Trace .008 2.881a .090 .008
Wilks' Lambda .992 2.881a .090 .008
Hotelling's Trace .008 2.881a .090 .008
Roy's Largest a
.008 2.881 .090 .008Root
policy * Sector Pillai's Trace .029 5 .2 2 9a .006 .029
Wilks' Lambda .971 5.229a .006 .029
Hotelling's Trace .029 5.229a .006 .029
Roy's Largest a
.029 5.229 .006 .029Root
policy * Income Pillai's Trace .104 2 0 .5 7 8 a .000 .104
Wilks' Lambda .896 20.578a .000 .104
Hotelling's Trace .116 20 .578a .000 .104
Roy's Largest aRoy's Largest .116 20.578 .000 .104Root
a. Interactions effect were not signinficant. and were not reported
b. Eta squared denoted amount of variation accounted for by the model effect, to a maximum
of 1.
Including both sectors and income as between subjects, as stated in KFAED's declared
policy, does give the result that the significant differences in the two policies vary
significantly over different income groups and over different sectors. Table 20 shows the
multivariate results for both the income and sector groups, entered as main effect. Both
effects are significant at 1 percent for income and 5 percent for the sector.
The Eta associated with both factors, which represents the size effect of each subject on
the model, is relatively small and does indeed direct us to further investigate other
possible factors that might explain the policies' differences.
The usual suspects for sources in such differences of policies are "political" reasons. One
of the candidates that can best represent such sources is a country's specific factor(s).
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This factor can capture and encompass a variety of unique and specific attributes, such as
ethnic, religious, economic and political, that are considered specific to the country.
Taking the above into consideration, and adding country factor, as fixed effect, as
between subject 32 enables us to capture some of sources of the differences between the
two policies. The country factor appears to be not only significant but its size effect of
.478 (Table 21) is higher than the combined effect size of both income and sectors
together: the same two variables that KFAED contend in its declared policy are the two
main factors that influence the grant element allocations.
Table 22: Multivariate Result (Country-Income-Sector--main effect)
Multivariate: Country-Sector-Income b
Partial Eta
Effect Value F Sig. Squared
Policy Pillai's Trace .002 .466a .495 .002
Wilks' Lambda .998 .4 6 6a .495 .002
Hotelling's Trace .002 .4 66 a .495 .002
Roy's Largest Root .002 .466a .495 .002
policy * Country Pillai's Trace .478 2.782a .000 .478
Wilks' Lambda .522 2.782a .000 .478
Hotelling's Trace .917 2.782a .000 .478
Roy's Largest Root .917 2.782a .000 .478
policy * Sector Pillai's Trace .054 7.600a .001 .054
Wilks' Lambda .946 7.600a .001 .054
Hotelling's Trace .057 7.600a .001 .054
Roy's Largest Root .057 7.600a .001 .054
policy * Income Pillai's Trace .142 22.045a .000 .142
Wilks' Lambda .858 22 .04 5 a .000 .142
Hotelling's Trace .165 22.045a .000 .142
Roy's Largest Root .165 22.045a .000 .142
a. Exact statistic
b.
Design: Intercept+Country+SectorRank+Incomec
Within Subjects Design: policy
As was documented in the second chapter, the country factor does play a role in the
allocation process in KFAED's decision making. Here, the grant element allocation
32
Political alliance proxy: The UN similarity/dissimilarity vote was tested. The result was not significant.
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seems to be influenced by some of the recipients' attributes that are not related to
economic or development factors. Running country as dummy failed to indicate any
significant result, which led us, in the next section, to test the impact of certain recipients'
attributes on the allocation of grant element.
GE Determination Stage
In our previous GLM result, we limited our analysis to comparing the stated vs.
actual policy of KFAED's grant element allocations. In this stage, we investigate the
factors that influence the distribution of grant element that were obtained in our GLM
testing, namely, what attributes, which are unique to recipient countries, influence the
KFAED's grant element allocation.
Model Specifications
An ordinary least square (OLS) regression with all time-varying explanatory variables
enter the regressions with a one-year lag to mimic the data situation facing KFAED at the
time of decision-making.
Testing GE Determinants
In this model, we are interested in uncovering the factor(s) that are related to the
"Country" effect that accounted for the major reason for the difference between declared
and actual policy analyzed before.
Four attributes that represent country uniqueness were selected that are expected to have
the potential of capturing the factors influencing the allocation. These four attributes are:
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Ethnicity: To check for potential bias towards Arab countries, a dummy variable
was used. An Arab dummy variable was set to 1 for Arab and 0 for non-Arab.
This dummy covers all countries with a majority Arab population.
Religious: There is a potential for a bias toward Muslims recipients in KFAED
allocation; therefore, an Islamic dummy was set to 1 for all countries with a
majority of Muslims, other than Arab countries.
Political: A control variable to measuring the similarity of policy positions.
Gartzke, Jo and Tucker [1999] use this measure to provide estimates of the
similarity of policy positions as revealed by the voting behavior in the UN
General Assembly. We take the similarity of policy positions between aid
recipient countries and Kuwait.
Development Need: We have added PLQI to take into account any development
backwardness that was not captured in the GNI per capita income.
Sectors were entered as dummy, as classified by KFAED's guidelines. As concerns
explanatory variables, the GNI per capita, PLQI, to proxy the development need, were
logged in order to allow an elasticity interpretation of their coefficients. If both the
dependent and the explanatory variables are in logged form, then the respective
coefficient can be interpreted as stating by how many percent the dependent variable is
increasing or decreasing given a 1 percent increase in the explanatory variable. An
elasticity interpretation makes perfect sense for the income and development needs
variables, for which percent increases carry substantive meaning.
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The ordinary least square (OLS) is in the following form:
Ln %GrantElementt = ao + PArab + / 2Musl + I3UN,_, +
+ f 4LnPLQI,-_ + +PLn PerCapitat_ + 6Sector
The summary statistics of the above are in Table 22.
Table 23: OLS Summary Statistics and Coefficients--Country Factor
lndependent variable Value t Pr > t
Agriculture 0.008 -0.292 0.772
Arab 0.035 1.24 0.223
Muslim 0.017 0.702 0.487
LOG PLQI -0.023 -0.737 0.466
LOG GNI per capita -0.078 -2.703 0.01
UN Vote 0.458 2.054 0.047
R2 0.238
Neither sector type nor recipient ethnicity nor religion is statically significant in
influencing the grant element level. Both the per capita income and the similarity of
votes, as represented by the similarity of UN vote are significant at the 1 and 5 percent
level, respectively, with the expected sign. A higher per capita for recipient will yield a
lower grant element level by 8 percent.
The way the UN voting variable is constructed makes it more difficult to provide a useful
interpretation of its coefficient. However, one can say that a country with voting identical
to Kuwait is estimated to receive a grant element that is about 58 percent higher than a
country whose voting similarity value is equal to the sample mean.33 Such significance of
the voting pattern, we believe, is the main effect that contributed to the difference
between KFAED's actual and stated grant element allocation.
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The insignificance of PLQI should not be surprising. More often, donors place more
weight on such visible and easily understood variables as per capita income and not on
indicators like PLQI.
Testing the Role of Aid
In this section we test whether the strategies and roles of aid, as were reviewed in
the literature review, have any influence on KFAED's grant allocation policy.
The dependent variable, grant element, was logged to render its distribution less skewed.
Hypotheses
The Two Gaps: Under the traditional framework, development assistance should be
allocated to where there are substantial financial gaps, regardless of the political,
economic and financial environment of recipient countries. In its extreme but not
uncommon form this uses the per capita level as the sole or primary criteria in deciding
the level of grant element that should be allocated to a certain country. In a simplified
framework, the poorer a country is, the wider the financial gaps are, and the more per
capita assistance the country deserves. To an extent, major multilateral development
institutions are still under the influence of this line of thinking. For example, in
determining whether a country is eligible for its funds under concessional terms, the first
criterion the World Bank uses is per capita GNP. If a country has a per capita GNP higher
than its cutoff threshold, this theory holds that the financial gaps are not large enough to
justify the allocation of concessional resources, no matter how good the policy
environment is in this country. Therefore, the lower level of per capita income of the
recipient, the higher grant element allocated by KFAED.
Macroeconomic Management: As was suggested before, macroeconomic policy
management has a profound effect on a country's overall development. The World Bank
shifted toward accomplishing this strategy through structural adjustment programs in the
1980s until the mid-1990s. Through these programs, varieties of conditionality were
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attached to the aid, the majority of them dealing with fiscal and external imbalances.
Stanley Fisher suggested using inflation as a proxy for such an indicator. Consistent with
other studies, this research will test whether KFAED's development assistance is
allocated to countries that are implementing good economic policies. However, this
factor is not expected to have any significance on KFAED's policy due to the fact that the
fund only finances projects, and not programs, and thus no conditionality is imposed on
the recipient.
Governance34 : This variable is included to determine whether the quality of a country's
institutional framework explains its tendency to receive higher grant element. The
Meltzer Report argues in favor of supporting countries with good policies. There are
many proxies that were used in the empirical literature: PLQI and GDP per capita
growth to name two. The Index of Economic Freedom, published by the Heritage
Foundation, is a measure of a policy's performance. The Index rates each country on the
basis of 50 economic variables divided into 10 major sections. The ratings are on a scale
from 1 to 5, with 1 representing the most "free" economies. However, when using the
index, our sample shrinks by two-thirds due to the absence of data prior to 1995.
Testing the above roles on KFAED's policy by running the following regression:
Ln %GrantElementt = a o + , LnInflation,_ + I 2LnGovernance,_, + /3Ln GNIPerCapita,_1
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Table 24: OLS Role of Aid
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 Ln GNI
-.062 .023 -.393 -2.638 .010
percapita
Ln Infllation -.002 .011 -.017 -. 159 .874
Ln Governance -.224 .153 -.216 -1.462 .147
a. Dependent Variable: Ln GE
The result, in Table 23, shows only income per capita as significant, suggesting that the
two-gap model is still alive in KFAED's allocation process. Neither inflation nor
governance coefficient were significant. This is expected, as KFAED does not impose
conditionalities nor favor such ones on recipient countries.
We further tested the allocations for the debt overhang hypothesis as suggested by the
literature: by adding debt service as percentage of GNI. The result is trivial and not
reported.
III.6 Conclusions
The main thrust of the research was directed toward studying two aspects of grant
element: estimation and allocation. Investigating both, and subsequently, testing both
yielded a significant results that affect both the way grant element is currently estimated
and the way allocation policy is being implemented. The main results and conclusions are
as follows:
The results in the grant element re-estimation do shed light on the consistent over-
estimation of published data on grant element. Using an ad hoc discount rate of 10
percent over the last 40 years not only overestimated the grant element of the majority of
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concessional loans, but also compounded the problem by creating a misclassification
issue. Concessional loans classified in many published aid statistics turn out to be non-
concessional loans when we adjust the discount rate to reflect the donor's cost of funds.
The overestimation and misclassification give a distorted picture even when a donor is
determined to allocate aid effectively. Such allocation might turn out to be allocated
ineffectively once the donor's cost of aid is used. This issue is not specific to the Kuwaiti
Fund, but it applies to all published aid statistics.
As the development community is debating increasing the concessionality, or grant
element, in development aid, this research adds to the debate an angle that was not
investigated systematically in the literature.
Our rationale for using donor's cost of funds is clear. Only the owner can concede, not
the recipient of the concession or grant. When an agent offers a concession or a grant,
he/she is conceding the benefit that might otherwise accrue to him/her. Therefore, to
measure concessionality or grant, one must use the owner's forgone benefit as the proxy
for such a cost.
KFAED's stated and actual grant element policies differ significantly. While KFAED's
guidelines state that only income and sector are the main determinants of grant allocation,
the results show otherwise. Not only did income of the recipient and sector financed play
a role in the differences, but country specific factor played an even more important role in
the actual policy of allocation. The main factor is the country specific factors, as
represented by both trade volume between Kuwait and the recipients and the authenticity
of recipients: as being an Arab. However, there may exist other politically related factors
(such as a high official from the recipient country visiting Kuwait or a new government
146
CHAPTER THREE: E Fi~MPrR r~ d r. dN A r VC~C ~R ~-L) A hTT P~ FAAPhTT
PJAIrDTVD TI-IDVIW IMPII I. -A A-L-Y. -RANT -E--NT
taking office in the recipient country) that influence such deviation of policies. However,
proxies to emulate such factors are hard to construct.
In testing KFAED allocation policy against the hypotheses presented in the literature
review: the two gap model, macro-policy management and institutional and governance,
the results were not surprising. It is the policy of Kuwait Fund, since inception, to use per
capita income as one of the major yardsticks in its allocation of aid. Therefore, the two-
gap model has been always part of the policy of the Fund. As to the other two roles of
aid, macro-management and institutional and governance, neither have an effect on
KFAED's allocation policy. Kuwait Fund shunned imposing conditionality in its
operation and focused only on financing projects.
The role of aid, as shown in the empirical literature review, is multifaceted and
complementary of different roles. Extending aid without monitoring, or without attaching
conditions relating to performance, and bad governance all make the aid a burden on the
recipient rather than a benefit. If KFAED's policy is not to impose conditionality, then
allocating grant based on certain proxies of performance is feasible. The same applies to
institutional strengthening and governance.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
We have described the trajectory of the KFAED program against the trajectory of
development policies of the IFIs both to give our analysis a context and to underline the
real function played by a South-South development aid fund. Our results should be of
interest to the KFAED management to consider in any future revamping of their aid
policy. Since the absolute amount of aid disbursed by KFAED is trivial compared to that
of all Western donors (of which fact perspective recipients are naturally aware), the
expected "aid effectiveness" is also relatively trivial. On the other hand, the global effect
of KFAED aid can be amplified in two ways: it can generate models that will influence
the behavior of other South-South development aid institutions, and it can form alliances
with other South-South development aid institutions. Given the explosive growth of
China, India, and the Southeast Asian states, it is reasonable to expect that South-South
developmental aid will probably grow as a share of the aid sector in the coming decades,
if not in terms of autonomous and separate agencies, then as a share of the funds
allocated by IFIs. KFAED will no doubt be studied closely by other potential South-
South donors for useful departures from the IFI and Western multilateral norms.
In one way, KFAED will remain unusual. Since Kuwait does not seek economic
complementarities that would supplant or align with its primary product export
orientation, and has even inscribed its "disinterestedness" in the "branding" of the
KFAED programs, KFAED does have the opportunity of offering a "clean" kind of aid,
not attached to the suspicion of self-interest that has often guided Western aid. At the
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same time, as we have pointed out, the criticism of development aid as an instrument of
the Western economies' self-interests is based on the mistaken assumption that economic
self-interest is a zero-sum game.
The temptation to which KFAED should not succumb is the use of aid for purely
security-seeking reasons, which can lead to KFAED becoming the counterweight to
reform - the donor of last resort for stagnant statist regimes, resistant to IFI-suggested
market reforms. KFAED is going to have to negotiate its traditional preference for
regional stability and its willingness to adapt to significant change in a Middle Eastern
environment encountering a marked turbulence, and enter an era in which the demands
on the human welfare infrastructure (education, health, and the environment) are bound
to increase dramatically.
KFAED, as the first South-South institution in 1960s, was under considerable
pressure to allocate aid with some nationalistic, religious and political flavor. Given the
Cold War atmosphere in which development aid was always granted in the context of
political gains or losses to the major contending sides, it is understandable that political
factors would also underlie KFAED's activities. Kuwait's own position in the
international nation-state system has to be seen as occupying different places in different
nestings: on one level, Kuwait and the other Gulf States were and are the strongest allies
of the West; on another level, Kuwait and the Middle Eastern states were allies in the
local conflict with Israel, putting them on the other side from the United States; on still
another level, Kuwait exists within the local Gulf State system, and has had to balance
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threats from states such as Iraq and Iran as it can. Given these sometimes inconsistent
situations, Kuwait's aid, while not being a simple function of the security-seeking
mandate of the state, has been pulled in different directions depending on state responses
to perceived threats. It is probably unrealistic to expect any donor nation to completely
disregard its valid interests in security when considering aid disbursement, but those
interests should be mediated by less partisan models of economic rationality.
KFAED needs to address the issue of aid effectiveness seriously. As a first step,
KFAED should take measures to shore up its credibility by adjusting its grant element
estimation using the model that we present or one like it. Such policy will not only
benefit the recipients financially, but more importantly increase the credibility of KFAED
as a donor within the international development aid landscape. This will lead to the
further step of making aid more responsive to the recipient situation, using such
instruments as a variable interest rate with a cap. Offering concessional loans without
material, quantifiable performance measures is an invitation to rent seeking and counter-
productive effects on the recipient. Transparency should always be the guideline here,
especially as KFAED is small enough to be immune to the enlargement of the
bureaucratic armature that transparency initiatives often incite among IFIs. Our modeling
of real grant element is one example of producing better accounting measures to better
understand the terms of concessional aid. Given the governance issues that are only going
to increase in importance in the next decade, KFAED would do well to aim at being a
precursor in the development of accountability instruments in the Middle East, since this
is an area in which its small size could make it an unthreatening model.
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Reevaluating its target aid projects could also leverage KFAED's smaller scale. For
instance, KFAED could specialize in a few sectors instead of considering the whole
spectrum of sectors considered by the IFIs. It might well be that seeking aid from
KFAED for certain kinds of projects in which the IFIs are dominant is a sign in itself of
problems with the recipient's project. One option for KFAED is targeting the
development of financing services. This would be a good matching of capability to need,
given Kuwait's rich and singular history in the financial service sector. Whatever the
portfolio of development projects KFAED takes on board, it must incorporate institution-
building and governance as primary considerations in interacting with recipient countries.
Kuwait is a perfect candidate to be a "broker" of governance reform. Brokers are
commonly peripheral enough to span boundaries, but significant enough to operate as
vectors for change. Kuwait has operated within the various nestings of the world system
in just this way for decades. As a period of turbulence seems to be on the horizon in the
Middle Eastern region, KFAED is positioned to enable large-scale changes in economic
practice without posing the threats to sovereignty or identity posed by IFIs.
KFAED has an in-house advantage insofar as it has been in operation over decades.
Its contacts and position, as well as its own variety of experts in the governance domain,
are being underutilized by dysfunctional designs in the development projects that
KFAED accepts, as well as insufficient monitoring of follow-through. If KFAED
emphasized a narrower range of projects, with commonalities related to the core
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competencies that are special to KFAED, its brokering position would situate it favorably
to engage in pooling of aid projects.
A carrier structure (i.e., one designed to be supported by multiple donors), such as a
regional development bank, would be one vehicle by which KFAED might increase the
impact of its aid as it decreases the number of candidates for that aid. This can increase
KFAED's leverage and exposure of its significant funding to these recipients. The
framing question would be, of course, whether KFAED would dilute its power in these
kinds of arrangements. This is pertinent insofar as Kuwait's interest in maintaining
KFAED is essential for its continuing existence. KFAED, like any bilateral organization,
must serve two constituencies - its recipient clients, and its domestic audience of
policymakers and supporters. The decline of aid levels throughout the globe is, in part, a
reflection of the neglect of domestic constituencies by aid agencies. If, however, KFAED
takes its role as a broker seriously, it could ensure continuing support from its domestic
constituency even as it catalyzes needed changes in the Middle Eastern region.
KFAED can establish a "smart concessional finance" policy that can help enable
it to both distinguish itself from other donors and more effectively promote development.
There are some sensible approaches that it can explore. One of these approaches is a
continuous forgiveness. KFAED can establish a set of conditions, which, when met by
the recipient, will enable the debt of that year to be forgiven. So in essence the loan is
converted to a grant for that year. These conditions must be transparent and be monitored
independently. Another approach is grant unbundling: KFAED can separate the cash
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grant equivalent from the market-based part. A recipient, thus, is offered a grant with an
option to borrow the rest at market rate. That would leave the recipient free to take the
loan only if appropriate; it would have no need to borrow to get the subsidy.
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